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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Social Services, ex rel. 
LARAMIE County, WYOMING 
ex rel. TERRY McNINCH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TERRY L. WESTMORELAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
1 Case No. 950268 CA 
I Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3 (2) (i) (1995) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the State of Utah had standing to bring the 
paternity/support action pursuant to the Utah Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act against Appellant Westmoreland. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which 
this Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the 
trial court's determination. Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 
P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); West Valley City Fraternal Order of 
Police v. Nordfelt. 869 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1993). 
1 
2. Whether the State of Utah's paternity/support action, 
brought pursuant to the Utah Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, is barred by the Wyoming Statute of Limitations. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which 
this Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the 
trial court's determination. Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 
(Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Appellee State of Utah generally agrees with Appellant 
Westmoreland's Statement of the Case; however, he fails to 
mention several relevant and important events. A trial was held 
before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, District Judge, on June 8, 
1994 (R. 327) . At the end of the trial, the parties were 
directed by the Court regarding the dates for submission of 
motions, memos, and responses (R. 462). The parties submitted 
their respective pleadings in accordance with the Court's 
direction (R. 254-278; R. 279-300; R. 301-308). The Court, 
after review of the motions, memos, and responses filed by the 
parties entered a memorandum decision in favor of the State of 
Utah on all issues on September 9, 1994 (attached in 
Addendum)(R. 311-315). 
2 
Thereafter, the Court requested that the State of Utah 
draft findings of fact and a decree for approval by 
Westmoreland's counsel (R. 479). The proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were submitted to Westmoreland's counsel 
and on February 21, 1995, he filed an Objection to the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Paternity, Judgment 
and Order of Support (R. 482-487). On February 24, 1995, the 
State of Utah filed a Response to Westmoreland's Objection (R. 
510-514). 
On February 27, 1995, Judge Hadfield entered detailed and 
specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 488-
502)(Appellant's Addendum). Judge Hadfield entered these 
findings after review of Westmoreland's Objections (Minute Entry 
dated May 19, 1995, not numbered in record). 
Based upon his findings, Judge Hadfield concluded that 
Westmoreland is the natural father of Cody Ray Holland, born on 
April 1, 1977; that a judgment for child support arrears should 
be entered in the amount of $11,088.00 for the time period of 
December 1988 through January 1995; and that Westmoreland should 
pay monthly child support for Cody Holland of $209.00 beginning 
3 
February 1995.x A d d i t i o n a l l y , as p a r t of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, judgments were a l s o e n t e r e d a g a i n s t 
Westmoreland in favor of t he n a t u r a l mother, Terry McNinch, in 
the amount of $506.00 for reimbursement of c o s t s for appear ing 
in t h i s a c t i o n , and a g a i n s t Westmoreland and in favor of t he 
S t a t e of Utah in the amount of $285.00 for the cos t of g e n e t i c 
blood t e s t i n g (R. 501-502) . 
The f i n a l Decree of P a t e r n i t y , Judgment and Order of 
Support (URESA) was e n t e r e d February 27, 1995 (R. 504-506) . 
Westmoreland f i l e d h i s Not ice of Appeal on March 28, 1995 (R. 
522) . Westmoreland's appeal does not cha l l enge the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s f ind ings and conc lus ions r ega rd ing the ongoing c h i l d 
suppor t amount, the a r r e a r a g e amounts, or the judgments for 
appearance and blood t e s t i n g c o s t s . 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Wyo. S t a t . § 20-4-101 to-137 (1994) Revised Uniform Rec ip roca l 
Enforcement of Support Act ( a t t ached in Addendum). 
Based upon the f a c t s found, Judge Hadfie ld concluded t h a t the a r r e a r s 
should be c a l c u l a t e d a t the r a t e of $175.00 per month for the months of 
December 1989 through June 1994 and a t the r a t e of $209.00 per month for the 
pe r iod of Ju ly 1994 through January 1995 (R. 501) . 
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The Notice of Appeal filed by Westmoreland states it is an appeal of 
the entire February 27, 1995 judgment, however, the only issues briefed by 
Westmoreland on appeal are standing and the statute of limitations (R. 522; 
Appellant's Br. at 3-6). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-1 to-39 (1995) Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (attached in Addendum). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l to-17 (1992 & Supp. 1995) Uniform Act 
on Paternity (attached in Addendum). 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-101 to-319 (1994 & Supp. 1995) Uniform 
Parentage Act (Appellant's Addendum). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1987) provides: 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action 
has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) provides: 
Within eight years an action: 
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of 
the United States, or of any state or territory within 
the United States. 
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become 
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance for 
dependent children. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1987) provides: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than 
for the recovery of real property, is at the time the 
cause of action accrued, either under the age of 
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, the time of the disability is not part of 
the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-45 (1995) provides: 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or 
territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws 
thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained 
against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an 
action thereon shall not be maintained against him in 
this state, except in favor of one who has been a 
5 
citizen of this state and who has held the cause of 
action from the time it accrued. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 provides: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1051, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, 
who in person or through an agent does any of the 
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an 
individual, his personal representative, to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any 
claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, 
or risk located within this state at the 
time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having 
resided, in the marital relationship, within 
this state notwithstanding subsequent 
departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the 
claim, so long as that act is not a mere 
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over 
which the defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within 
this state which gives rise to a paternity 
suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to 
determine paternity for the purpose of 
establishing responsibility for child 
support. 
6 
U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1 provides: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
The State of Utah generally agrees with the Statement of 
Facts as set forth in Westmoreland's brief; however, the State 
of* Utah wishes to supplement those facts. 
McNinch testified that she lived in Salt Lake City when she 
lived on and off with Westmoreland between 1975 and February 
1977 (R. 338) . Furthermore, McNinch testified that, prior to 
the child's birth, Westmoreland suspected McNinch was pregnant, 
and he told her "if you are, I'll leave and deny it's mine" (R. 
3 62) . Thereafter, when Westmoreland learned McNinch was 
pregnant, he denied the child was his, "got mad," and "tried to 
run [McNinch] over" (R. 3 62). 
Additionally, it was McNinch's testimony that when she was 
finally able to contact Westmoreland after the child's birth, 
Westmoreland told her that he did not want anything to do with 
the child and had returned to his wife (R. 343-344; R. 346). 
McNinch testified that from that point on she made numerous 
7 
attempts to locate Westmoreland, seeking assistance from 
Westmoreland's sister (R.390-391; R. 393-394; R. 397). At this 
point, McNinch believed Westmoreland was "hiding out" (R. 347-
349) . 
After the birth of the child, McNinch began dating Ernie 
Holland (R. 342; R. 3 91-392) . McNinch did not have sexual 
intercourse with Holland until May 1977, more than a month after 
the child's birth (R. 343; R. 439) . McNinch married Holland on 
May 13, 1977 (R. 342; R. 385). Holland treated the child like 
he would his own son, and wanted Cody to have his last name (R. 
344; R. 388; R. 441) . 
McNinch and Holland signed statements filed with Vital 
Statistics in the State of Wyoming acknowledging his paternity 
of the child, and an amended birth certificate that added 
Holland's name as Cody's father (R. 343; R. 386-387). McNinch 
and Holland had been erroneously informed that, since there was 
not a father listed on the original birth certificate, the 
stepfather could possibly adopt the child or at least change the 
child's surname by signing the amended birth certificate (R. 
344; R. 390; R. 437). McNinch and Holland later learned that 
signing the certificate did not result in a legal adoption (R. 
344). The child was never adopted (R. 344; R. 437). 
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McNinch and Holland were divorced on February 6, 1981. The 
Divorce Decree stated, "The Court finds that no children, now 
under the age of 18 years, were born to the marriage and none 
are expected." Based upon the language in the Divorce Decree, 
Judge Hadfield specifically found that there was no presumption 
that Holland is the presumed father of Cody Holland (R. 312). 
After the divorce from McNinch, Holland neither contacted the 
child nor provided any type of support (R. 3 88). 
McNinch testified that in 1981, Westmoreland came to a 
truck stop where McNinch was working and indicated to her that 
he was separated from his wife. Westmoreland went home with 
McNinch that night. The next morning Westmoreland "told Cody 
that he was his dad, Terry" (R. 350-352). Furthermore, McNinch 
testified that Westmoreland refused to provide either his 
address or phone number, and when the mother requested the 
information, Westmoreland simply stated that he lived in Cedar 
City, Utah (R. 353). 
Westmoreland again met the child in 1992, while McNinch and 
the child were visiting Westmoreland's sister in Brigham City, 
Utah (R. 357-358). During this visit, McNinch took several 
pictures of the father and child posing together (R. 358; R. 
449) . Before leaving, Westmoreland provided McNinch with his 
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work phone number at Miller Brothers in Hiram, Utah, and told 
the child that he could call him there (R. 360) . McNinch 
requested support from Westmoreland, but Westmoreland indicated 
that he could not pay (R. 3 62) . Later, when McNinch and the 
child attempted to contact the father at Miller Brothers, "they 
told us Terry was there; then they'd come back on the phone and 
say that he wasn't there" (R. 360-361). McNinch never told 
Westmoreland, or anyone else, that Westmoreland was not the 
natural father of the child, or that she did not wish to receive 
support from him (R. 3 62). 
The State of Wyoming provided public assistance to McNinch 
and the child from December 1989 through March 1990 and from 
March 1993 through June 1994 (R. 371-372). On May 15, 1992, the 
State of Wyoming, County of Laramie, as the initiating state, 
initiated proceedings pursuant to the revised Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act, Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-101 to-137 (1994) 
and requested that the State of Utah, as the responding state, 
file the current action (R. 8-34). 
On March 12, 1993, the State of Utah filed a complaint in 
this paternity action pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l to-17 (1992 & Supp. 1995), alleging 
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that Terry L. Westmoreland was the natural father of Cody R. 
Holland, born April 1, 1977 to Terry McNinch (R. 1-7). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
This Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) 
action was properly initiated by the State of Utah upon relation 
with the State of Wyoming and Terry McNinch. Pursuant to the 
URESA provisions, the State of Utah has standing to establish 
paternity and an order of support against Westmoreland. Under 
URESA, it was neither necessary nor proper to join the child as 
a party. Furthermore, under the URESA provisions, the law of 
the responding state, Utah, controls on all issues. This makes 
the Wyoming statute of limitations inapplicable. Thus, the 
action is not barred by the Wyoming Statute. 
Additionally, even if Wyoming, and not Utah, law controlled 
regarding the issue of fatherhood presumption, the trial court 
correctly concluded that the presumption of fatherhood had been 
rebutted by the divorce decree between McNinch and her ex-
husband, Ernie Holland. Therefore, the trial court correctly 




I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT STANDING OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS ACTION. 
A. Under the express provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act, as adopted by both the 
State of Utah and the State of Wyoming, the State of 
Utah, as the responding state, has standing to pursue 
this £CtiQnT 
Westmoreland has mistakenly asserted that the initiating 
state, in this case, Wyoming, must first establish that there is 
a duty of support before a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act (URESA) action can be pursued. URESA provides two 
different procedures for the civil enforcement of child support 
obligations in an interstate context. UA support duty can be 
civilly enforced under URESA through two procedures: the filing 
of a regular URESA petition and the registration of a "foreign" 
support order." M. Haynes, Interstate Child Support Remedies. 
Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, at 66 (Sept. 1989) (attached in Addendum) . 
The State of Utah has adopted the URESA. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-31-1 to-39 (1995) . Sections 77-31-11 through-31 provide the 
procedure for enforcement by petition, while sections § 77-31-32 
through-37 provide the procedure for enforcement on 
registration. Id. This case involves a "regular" URESA 
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petition, one which requests enforcement by petition, not a 
registration of a "foreign" order. The URESA Action Request 
Forms submitted to Utah by the State of Wyoming request that 
Utah establish a paternity order and establish an order of child 
support for unreimbursed public assistance (R. 15-16). 
This specific request by the initiating state, Wyoming, 
along with Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-24 (1995), provide the State 
of Utah with the authority as the responding state to determine 
a duty of support. In this regard, Utah's URESA provides: 
If the court of the responding state finds a duty of 
support, it may order the respondent to furnish 
support or reimbursement therefor and subject property 
of the respondent to such order. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-24 (1995). 
Importantly, the applicable law for determining this duty 
of support is the State of Utah's: 
Duties of support applicable under this act are those 
imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where 
the obligor was present during this period for which 
support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have 
been present in the responding state during the period 
for which support is sought until otherwise shown. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-7 (1995) . Furthermore, there is no 
evidence in this case that Westmoreland has been a resident of 
13 
any state other than Utah (R. 338; R. 353; R. 360) .3 This 
highlights the appropriateness of the State of Utah filing this 
complaint pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45a-l, to-17 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (R. 1-7) . 
Additionally, if a state or political sub-division has 
provided public assistance on behalf of an obligor's dependents, 
as the State of Wyoming has in this case, this state has the 
same right as the individual obligee to initiate a URESA 
proceeding for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement of the 
support furnished. Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-108 (1994). See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-8 (1995) . Thus, the public assistance 
provided by Wyoming in this case further fortifies its right to 
initiate the URESA request and the standing of the State of Utah 
in this case. 
Section 77-31-8 also sets out the remedies available to any 
state that has provided support for the child. This section 
provides: 
Whenever the s t a t e or p o l i t i c a l subdivision thereof 
furnishes support to an obligee, . . . the s t a t e or 
p o l i t i c a l subdivision has the same r igh t to invoke the 
provisions hereof as the obligee for the purposes of 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-4 (1995) which provides that "Duties of 
upport ar is ing under the law of th i s State [Utah] when applicable under 
ection 77-31-7 bind the obligor, present in t h i s Sta te , regardless of the 
presence or residence of the obligee." 
14 
securing reimbursement of support expenditures, 
collecting child support, and establishing paternity. 
Utah Code Ann, § 77-31-8 (1995)(emphasis added). See also Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-31-9 (1995) which authorizes the establishment of 
paternity actions under the Utah URESA. Therefore, the Utah 
statute explicitly grants the authority to seek a paternity 
determination in a URESA action. 
It should also be noted the trial court specifically found 
that McNinch was a resident of the State of Utah at the time of 
conception and the conception occurred in the State of Utah (R. 
312). Under Utah law,4 McNinch would have the right the pursue 
this action even if she chose to bypass URESA. In this regard, 
Westmoreland submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
courts in a paternity suit for the purpose of establishing 
responsibility for child support when he engaged in sexual 
intercourse within the state. See Baldwin v. Easterling, 754 
P.2d 942 (Utah 1988) . 
Utah law states that a person submits himself to the jurisdiction of 
Utah Courts if he engages in, "the commission of sexual intercourse within 
this State which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, 
to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for 
child support." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(7) (Supp. 1995). 
15 
B. The trial court correctly held that there was no 
presumption that Ernie IfoUanfl is £Jl£ biological 
father of Cody Holland. 
As discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that 
Utah, not Wyoming law, applies in this case (R. 312). The blood 
test results in this case showed a probability of 99.99% with an 
index of 59047 to 1 that Westmoreland is the natural father of 
Cody Holland (Exhibits 1-2)(attached in Addendum). Under Utah 
la,w, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-10(3) (a) (1992), "A man is presumed 
to be the natural father of a child if genetic testing results 
with a paternity index of at least 100." Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45a-10(3)(b) (1992), this presumption "may be rebutted in 
an appropriate action by clear and convincing evidence." This 
presumption has not been rebutted in this case. Therefore, 
under Utah law, the presumption is that Westmoreland, not 
Holland, is the natural father of Cody Holland. 
However, assuming that Wyoming law applies as Westmoreland 
does when he next argues that under Wyoming law, the State of 
Utah lacks standing because Ernie Holland and Terry McNinch, 
following their marriage, signed and filed acknowledgments of 
his paternity of Cody. 
It is undisputed that Ernie Holland married Terry McNinch, 
and acknowledgments of paternity were signed and filed with the 
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Vital Records Services (Exhibits 9-10) . The State of Utah 
acknowledges that pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(a) (Supp. 
1995), Holland may have thereafter been considered the 
"presumed" father of Cody Holland, even though he could not be 
the natural father.5 However, such a presumption is not 
conclusive and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 
See LCv. TL. 870 P.2d 374 (Wyo. 1994). 
Westmoreland argues that t h i s presumption of fatherhood for 
Holland has never been rebutted under Wyoming law. His two 
bases for t h i s argument are set for th in h is br ief at pages 12-
13. F i r s t , Wyo. S ta t . 14-2-102(b) (1995), s t a t e s : 
A presumption under t h i s sect ion may be rebutted in an 
appropriate action only by c lea r and convincing 
evidence. If two (2) or more presumptions a r i s e in 
conf l ic t with each other, the presumption which on the 
fac ts i s founded on the weightier considerat ions of 
policy and logic controls . A presumption i s rebutted 
by a court decree es tabl ish ing pa t e rn i t y of the chi ld 
by another man. 
Second, Westmoreland r e l i e s on the t r i a l testimony of Holland 
s t a t i ng tha t he had not i n i t i a t e d an act ion to rebut the 
Both Holland and McNinch t e s t i f i e d that no sexual re la t ions took place 
between them prior to the b ir th of Cody Holland and there ex i s ted no 
p o s s i b i l i t y that Holland could be the natural father of the chi ld (R. 343; R. 
439) . 
Holland a l so t e s t i f i e d that he and the mother signed the acknowledgment 
because they were to ld that t h i s was a way to change the b ir th c e r t i f i c a t e so 
the ent ire family could have the same surname (R. 437) . 
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presumption that he was the natural father of Cody Holland (R. 
442) . 
Westmoreland's arguments are without merit. Holland's 
testimony is irrelevant on whether the presumption has been 
rebutted. The language of the Wyoming statute is that the 
presumption may be rebutted in an appropriate action. Wyo. 
Stat. 14-2-102(b) (1995). The fact is that the issue of 
Holland's presumed fatherhood of Cody Holland was adjudicated in 
an appropriate action. In this regard, on February 6, 1981, a 
Decree of Divorce was entered in the 254th Judicial District 
Court in Dallas County, Texas between Holland and McNinch. The 
Court in that action stated: 
[H]aving examined the pleadings and heard the evidence 
and argument of counsel, finds that all necessary 
residence qualifications and prerequisites of law have 
been legally satisfied, that this Court has 
jurisdiction of all the parties and subject matter of 
this cause, and that the material allegations 
contained in Petitioner's pleadings are true. A jury 
was waived, and all matters in controversy, including 
questions of fact and of law, were submitted to the 
Court. All persons entitled to citation were properly 
cited. 
Based thereon, the Court ruled as follows: 
The Court finds that no children, now under the age of 
eighteen years, were born to the marriage and none are 
expected. 
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(Exhibit 6) (attached in Addendum) . Westmoreland has not 
challenged the validity of this order, thus, Utah and Wyoming 
are required to give this Texas judgment Full Faith and Credit 
under Article IV of the United States Constitution. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that subsequent 
challenges to such a decree are foreclosed by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. See Livingston v. Vanderiet. 861 P. 2d 549 (Wyo. 
1993). In Livingston, the court stated: uWe have held that a 
decree of divorce granted by one state having jurisdiction to do 
so is entitled to Full Faith and Credit under the Constitutional 
provision, in every other state." Id. at 551 (citing Matter of 
Fray, 721 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1986)). 
The public policy behind recognition of judicial 
proceedings by another state has been summarized as follows: 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States finally determines the conditions under which 
the decrees of Courts in one state are to be 
recognized in other states. In these days of a mobile 
population, it is highly desirable, if not essential, 
for a divorce decree to be unchallengeable in all 
states. 
Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States. 
Section 11.2, at 287 (1968) (as quoted in Fray, 721 P.2d at 
1058). In Livingston, the Court held that absent a showing that 
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a divorce decree from another state was invalid or voidable, it 
would be given Full Faith and Credit in the URESA proceeding in 
Wyoming. Livingston, 861 P.2d at 551. 
Giving Full Faith and Credit to the Texas divorce decree, 
under Wyoming law, the Texas court's finding that no children 
were born to the marriage included Cody Holland and rebutted any 
presumption that Holland was the natural father of Cody Holland.6 
Had there been an issue of paternity and support, the decree of 
divorce between McNinch and Holland would have addressed the 
issue. Had either party wished to continue the parental 
relationship, some provision would have been made at the time. 
Instead, the presumption of paternity was rebutted, and Holland 
severed his relationship with Cody Holland and never continued 
to give his support thereafter (R. 368) . Thus, Holland 
satisfied the requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(b) (1995). 
Additionally, it should be noted that, notwithstanding 
Westmoreland's arguments regarding the presumption, the Decree 
of Paternity entered in this action is a court decree 
establishing paternity of the child by someone other than 
The issue of paternity can be adjudicated in a divorce proceeding. See 
Masters v. Worsely. 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); also, a divorce decree 
is a final judgment and res judicata on all issues decided. See Warren v. 
Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo. 1987). 
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Holland (R. 504-407)(Appellant's Addendum). Therefore, under 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(b) (1995), Holland's 
presumption of fatherhood of the child in this action has been 
properly rebutted. 
c. it was not necessary to m^ke the gfrjlfl a party to this 
URESA actiont 
Westmoreland cites Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-107 (1995) as 
authority for his contention that the State of Utah lacks 
standing because the child was not made a part of this action. 
It is important to note that this action is not being brought 
pursuant to the Wyoming Parentage Act at Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-101 
to -319 (1993 & Supp. 1995) . It was brought pursuant to the 
URESA laws of Wyoming and Utah. In URESA proceedings, because 
the issue is duty to support, courts have held that the person 
having physical custody of the minor child has standing to 
initiate a URESA action without the appointment as guardian ad 
litem. See Saask v. Yandell, 702 P.2d 1327 (Alaska 1985); 
Suddeth v. Scott, 394 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1984); and McMullen v. 
Muir, 517 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio App. 1986). 
As outlined above, this action was properly initiated by 
the State of Wyoming and responded to by the State of Utah under 
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URESA. The Utah URESA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-13 
provides: 
A petition on behalf of a minor obligee may be brought 
by a person having legal custody of the minor without 
appointment as guardian ad litem. 
And the Wyoming URESA pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 20-4-113 (1994) 
states: 
A complaint on behalf of a minor obligee may be 
executed and filed by a person having legal custody of 
the minor without appointment as guardian ad litem. 
Thus, it was not necessary to join the child as a party as 
asserted by Westmoreland. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS URESA ACTION 
BROUGHT BY THE STATE OF UTAH TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY AND AN 
ORDER OF SUPPORT WAS NOT BARRED BY THE WYOMING STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
A. Utah l^ w applies, &Q the Wyoming Statute Ot 
limitations is inapplicable and under Utah law, there 
is no time limit as to when a paternity action may be 
brought
 t 
Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
adopted by both the State of Utah and the State of Wyoming, the 
laws of the responding state apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-
4 to-7 (1995); Wyo. Stat. § 20-4-107 (1994). Thus, in the 
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ins tant action, the Wyoming s t a tu t e of l imi t a t ions would not be 
applicable because Utah law would apply.7 
In Nielsen v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977), the State 
and a c h i l d ' s mother brought an act ion to e s t ab l i sh pa te rn i ty 
and a chi ld support ob l iga t ion . The t r i a l court had dismissed 
the complaint based upon the s t a tu t e of l imi ta t ions in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) . The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the t r i a l court and s t a t ed tha t there was no time l imi t as to 
when a su i t may be i n i t i a t e d to determine pa t e rn i t y . Nielsen 
564 P. 2d at 1114. Nielsen has not been overruled and remains 
the law. 
The issue of the s t a t u t e of l imi ta t ions in chi ld support 
ccplLections was ra ised also in Szarak v. Sandoval. 636 P. 2d 1082 
(Utah 1981). In that decision, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed 
the Uniform Act on Pa tern i ty and observed tha t a p e t i t i o n 
seeking pa tern i ty establishment may be f i l ed by the mother, the 
chi ld , or the public au thor i ty (the Department of Human 
Furthermore, because McNinch was a r e s i d e n t of the S t a t e of Utah a t the 
time of conception of the c h i l d , even i f the Wyoming s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s 
ba r red the ac t i on t h e r e , i t s t i l l could be maintained in Utah. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-45 (1995), which p r o v i d e s : "When a cause of a c t i o n has a r i s e n in 
another s t a t e or t e r r i t o r y , or in a fore ign country , and by the laws thereof 
an a c t i o n thereon cannot t h e r e be maintained a g a i n s t a person by reason of the 
l apse of t ime, an a c t i o n thereon s h a l l not be maintained a g a i n s t him in t h i s 
s t a t e , except in favor of one who has been a c i t i z e n of t h i s s t a t e and who has 
he ld the cause of a c t i o n from the time i t accrued ." 
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Services) and that once paternity is established, the liability 
for child support may be enforced in the same or other 
proceeding by the mother, the child, or the public authority. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l, 78-45a-2 (1992 & Supp. 1995) . 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Szarak that the other two 
statutes of limitations under § 78-12-1 were not applicable in 
establishing paternity. The Szarak Court found that Utah Code 
Anp. § 78-12-36 (1987) , the tolling statute regarding causes of 
actions of a minor, precluded the application of any period of 
limitation against the child, the child's mother, and the public 
authority. 
The Court in Szarak went on to hold that the statute of 
limitation is tolled during the child's minority for a paternity 
and child support action undertaken by the child's mother and/or 
the State, based upon the public policies protected by the 
tolling provisions of section 78-12-36. Szarak. 636 P. 2d at 
1085. 
Thus, in the instant case, under applicable Utah law, there 
is no statute of limitations for bringing this action. 
B. Even if the Wyoming statutes were applicable, this 
action was brought within that limitation. 
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Interestingly, the applicable statute of limitation in the 
State of Wyoming, even if it did apply, would not act as a bar 
to the establishment of paternity in this case. Wyoming law 
provides as follows: 
An action to determine the existence of the father and 
child relationship as to a child who has no presumed 
father under W.S. [Wyo. Stat.] 14-2-102 may be 
brought: (i) not later than three (3) years after the 
child reaches the age of majority if the action is 
brought by or on behalf of the child or by the 
department of family services; or (ii) not later than 
five (5) years after the birth of the child in all 
other cases. 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-105(a) (1994). 
One of the foundational premises underlying the Uniform 
Parentage Act is that a father of a minor child receiving public 
assistance ought to reimburse the public for the support of his 
child. £££ Ellison vf welter ex rel, Walter/ 834 p.2d 680 (Wyo. 
1992). To further this policy, the Uniform Parentage Act grants 
standing to a state to initiate a paternity action on behalf of 
a child receiving public assistance within three (3) years after 
the child reaches the age of majority. See Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-
105(a) (1994) . 
This action was initiated by the Department of Family 
Services in the State of Wyoming, Laramie County, before the 
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child reached the age of majority; therefore, the action is 
within the statute of limitations under Wyoming law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the 
lower court's Decree, Order and Judgment. In this regard, there 
is ample authority to support the trial court's conclusion that 
the State of Utah has standing to bring this URESA action and 
the claim is not barred by the Wyoming statute of limitations. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of September, 1995. 
Billy L. Walker 
Steven A. Combe 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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Art. I l l , § 3 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
[3.] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by 
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall 
have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial 
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed 
phrases in the first paragraph of this section 
were superseded by Amendment XL 
Sec. 3. [Treason, proof and punishment] 
[1.] Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or m adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. 
No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Wit-
nesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. 
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, 
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture 





1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial tions respecting the territory 
proceedings of states.) and property of the United 
2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives States.) 
from justice and service.) 4. (Guaranty of republican form of government 
3. [Admission of states — Rules and regula- and against invasion.) 
Section 1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial 
proceedings of states.] 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 
Sec. 2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives from jus-
tice and service.] 
[1.] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immu-
nities of Citizens in the several States. 
[2.] A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, 
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of 
the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be 
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. 
[3.] No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws 
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regula-
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Remedies additional to those now 
existing. 
Extent of duties of support. 
Interstate rendition. 
Conditions of interstate rendition. 
Choice of law. 
Remedies of state or political sub-
division furnishing support. 
How duties of support enforced. 
Jurisdiction. 
Contents of petition for support. 
County attorney to represent peti-
tioner. 
Petition for a minor. 
Duty of court of this state as initi-
ating state. 
Costs and fees. 
Jurisdiction by arrest. 
State information agency. 
Duty of court and county attorney 
of this state as responding state. 
Further duties of court and county 
attorney of this state as the re-
sponding state. 
Procedure. 
Petitioner absent from responding 
state — Continuance. 



















Rules of evidence. 
Order of support. 
Court of this state as responding 
state to transmit copies to initi-
ating state. 
Additional powers of court of this 
state as responding state. 
Additional duties of court of this 
state as responding state. 
Duty of department acting as ini-
tiating state to receive and dis-
burse payments. 
Proceedings not to be stayed. 
Application of payments. 
Effect of participation in proceed-
ing. 
Foreign support orders — Addi-
tional remedies. 
Registration of foreign support or-
ders. 
Registry of foreign support orders 
maintained by clerk. 
Petition for registration of foreign 
support order. 
Jurisdiction and procedure. 
Effect of registration — Enforce-
ment procedure. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Citation — Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act. 
77-31-1. Purposes. 
The purposes of this act are to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation 
and enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect 
thereto. 
History: C. 1963, 77-31-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this 
act" literally means Laws 1980, ch. 15, which 
enacted this title. As the phrase is used 
throughout this chapter, however, and in light 
of § 77-31-39„ it probably means "this chapter." 
Cross-References. — Uniform Civil Liabil-
ity for Support Act, Title 78, Chapter 45. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v. Mitchell: 
Indigent Paternity Defendants' Right to Coun-
sel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion and 
Nonsupport § 117 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 73 
to 89. 
A.LJI. — Determination of paternity of child 
as within scope of proceeding under Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 81 
A.L.R.3d 1175. 
Key Numbers. — Parent and Child «=» 3 to 
3.4. 
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77-31-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any 
foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law 
or procedure is in effect. 
(2) "Initiating state" means any state in which a proceeding pursuant to 
this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced. 
(3) "Responding state" means any state in which any proceeding pur-
suant to the proceeding in the initiating state is or may be commenced. 
(4) "Court" means the district court of this state and when the context 
requires, means the court of any other state as defined in a substantially 
similar reciprocal law. 
(5) "Law" includes both common and statutory law. 
(6) "Duty of support" includes any duty of support imposed or imposable 
by law, or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or 
final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, 
separate maintenance or otherwise. 
(7) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
(8) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed and 
a state or political subdivision thereof. 
(9) "Governor" includes any person performing the functions of gover-
nor or the executive authority of any territory covered by the provisions of 
this act. 
(10) "Support order" means any judgment, decree or order of support, 
whether temporary or final, whether subject to modification, revocation or 
remission regardless of the kind of action in which it is entered. 
(11) "Rendering state" means any state in which a support order is 
originally entered. 
(12) "Registering court" means any district court of this state in which 
the support order of the rendering state is registered. 
(13) "Register" means to file in the registry of foreign support orders. 
(14) "Certification" shall be in accordance with the laws of the certifying 
state. 
(15) "Department" means the Department of Human Services. 
(16) "Title IV-D Agency" means the single and separate agency desig-
nated to enforce child support under an approved state plan pursuant to 
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and authorized to reimburse costs and 
pay incentive under that title. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-2, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Assignment of sup-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 66, § 1; 1990, ch. port to Department of Human Services, § 62A-
183, 5 51. 9-121. 
Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the Social Department of Human Services, § 62A-1-
Secunty Act, cited in Subsection (16), is codified 102 
as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. 
77-31-3. Remedies additional to those now existing. 
The remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for 
any other remedies. 
781 
77-31-4 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-4. Extent of duties of support. 
Duties of support arising under the law of this state when applicable under 
Section 77-31-7 bind the obligor, present in this state, regardless of the 
presence or residence of the obligee. 
Hiatory: C. 1953, 77-31-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
7*7-31-5. Interstate rendition. 
The governor of this state (1) may demand from the governor of any other 
state the surrender of any person found in such other state who is charged in 
this state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in 
this state and (2) may surrender on demand by the governor of any other state 
any person found in this state who is charged in such other state with the 
crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in such other state. The 
provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith shall apply to 
any such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not 
in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and 
although he had not fled therefrom. Neither the demand, the oath nor any 
proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need state or show that the 
perpon whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice, or at the time of the 
'commission of the crime was in the demanding or other state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-5, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Extradition, § 77-
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 30-1 et seq. 
77-31-6. Conditions of interstate rendition. 
(1) Before making the demand on the governor of any other state for the 
surrender of a person charged in this state with the crime of failing to provide 
for the support of any person, the governor of this state may require a county 
attorney or district attorney to satisfy him that at least sixty days prior thereto 
the obligee brought an action for the support under this act, or that the 
bringing of an action would be of no avail. 
(2) When under this or a substantially similar act, a demand is made upon 
the governor of this state by the governor of another state for the surrender of 
a person charged in the other state with the crime of failing to provide support, 
the governor may call upon any county attorney or district attorney to 
investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to report to him whether 
any action for support has been brought under this act or would be effective. 
(3) If an action for the support would be effective and no action has been 
brought, the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time to 
permit prosecution of an action for support. 
(4) If an action for support has been brought and the person demanded has 
prevailed in that action, the governor may decline to honor the demand. 
(5) If an action for support has been brought and pursuant thereto the 
person demanded is subject to a support order, the governor may decline to 
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honor the demand so long as the person demanded is complying with the 
support order. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-6, enacted by L. county attorney or district attorney" for "any 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1993, ch. 38, § 103. county attorney of this state" in Subsection (1) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- and inserted "or district attorney" near the 
ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "a middle of Subsection (2). 
77-31-7. Choice of law. 
Duties of support applicable under this act are those imposed or imposable 
under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for 
which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the 
responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise 
shown. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-7, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Law of forum state applies. Texas, where the divorce decree was entered. 
It was correct for tnal court to determine the Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 R2d 200 (Utah 
existence and extent of Utah resident's duty of 1976). 
support under the laws of Utah, rather than 
77-31-8. Remedies of state or political subdivision fur-
nishing support. 
Whenever the state or a political subdivision thereof furnishes support to an 
obligee, or whenever an individual not receiving support from the state or a 
political subdivision makes an application for child support collection or 
paternity determination services and pays an application fee, the state or 
political subdivision has the same right to invoke the provisions hereof as the 
obligee for the purposes of securing reimbursement of support expenditures, 
collecting child support, and establishing paternity. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-8, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Charlesworth v. California, 793 P.2d 
411 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
77-31-9. How duties of support enforced. 
All duties of support, including arrearages, and arrearages reimbursable to 
the state or a political subdivision thereof are enforceable by action irrespec-
tive of the relationship between the obligor and the obligee. Actions authorized 
under this act include establishment of paternity, wage assignments, garnish-
ment, liens, execution of liens, contempt proceedings and any other collection 
or enforcement procedure. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-31-9, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Child support. jurisdiction to enter an order regarding any 
matters other than the support obligation. 
—Visitation rights. Charlesworth v. California, 793 P.2d 411 (Utah 
The district court erred in its order condition- £ t ^pp. 1990) 
ing child support upon the affording of visita-
tion rights, because it lacked subject matter 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Paternity proceedings: nght to jury 
trial, 51 A.L.R.4th 565. 
77-31-10. Jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction of all proceedings hereunder is vested in the district court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-10, enacted by L. 78, Chapter 3; Chapter 6, Rules of Judicial 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Administration. 
Cross*References. — Distnct courts, Title 
77-31-11. Contents of petition for support. 
The petition shall be verified and shall state the name and, so far as known 
to the petitioner, the address and circumstances of the respondent and his 
dependants for whom support is sought, and all other pertinent information. 
The petitioner may include in, or attach to, the petition any information which 
may help in locating or identifying the respondent, such as a photograph of the 
respondent, a description of any distinguishing marks of his person, other 
names and aliases by which he has been or is known, the name of his employer, 
his fingerprints, or social security number. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-11, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-12. County attorney to represent petitioner. 
The county attorney, upon the request of the court or the director of the 
Department of Human Services or his appointed representative, shall repre-
sent the petitioner in the initiation of any proceedings under this act. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-12, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1990, ch. 183, § 52. 
77-31-13. Petition for a minor. 
A petition on behalf of a minor obligee may be brought by a person having 
legal custody of the minor without appointment as guardian ad litem. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-33 enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, 9 2. 
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77-31-14. Duty of court of this state as initiating state. 
If the court of this state, acting as an initiating state, finds that the petition 
sets forth facts from which it may be determined that the respondent owes a 
duty of support and that a court of the responding state may obtain jurisdiction 
of the defendant or his property, it shall so certify and may cause three copies 
of (1) the petition (2) its certificate and (3) this act to be transmitted to the 
court and Title IV-D Agency in the responding state. If the name and address 
of such court is unknown or if the IV-D agencies in the initiating state and 
responding state have so agreed, it shall cause such copies to be transmitted to 
the Title IV-D Agency of the responding state, with a request that it forward 
them to the proper court, and that the court of the responding state acknowl-
edge their receipt to the court of the initiating state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-14, enacted by L. Cross-References. — "Title IV-D Agency" 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. defined, § 77-31-2. 
77-31-15. Costs and fees. 
There shall be no filing fee or other costs taxable to the obligee, but a court 
of this state acting either as an initiating or responding state may in its 
discretion direct that any part of or all fees and costs incurred in this state, 
including without limitation by enumeration, fees for filing, service of process, 
seizure of property, and stenographic service of both petitioner and respondent 
6r either, be paid by the obligor. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-15, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-16. Jurisdiction by arrest. 
When the court of this state, acting either as an initiating or responding 
state, has reason to believe that the respondent may flee the jurisdiction it may 
(1) as an initiating state request in its certificate that the court of the 
responding state obtain the body of the defendant by appropriate process if 
that be permissible under the law of the responding state; or (2) as a 
responding state, obtain the body of the respondent by appropriate process. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-16, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-17. State information agency. 
The department is hereby designated as the state information agency under 
this act, and it shall: 
(1) Compile a list of the courts and their addresses in this state having 
jurisdiction under this act and transmit the same to the state information 
agency of every other state which has adopted this or a substantially 
similar act; and 
(2) Maintain a register of such lists received from other states and 
transmit copies thereof as soon as possible after receipt to every court in 
this state having jurisdiction under this act. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-31-17, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-18. Duty of court and county attorney of this state 
as responding state. 
(1) After the court of this state acting as a responding state has received 
from the court of the initiating state the aforesaid copies, the clerk of the court 
shall docket the case and notify the county attorney of his action. 
(2) It shall be the duty of the county attorney diligently to prosecute the 
case. He shall take all action necessary in accordance with the laws of this 
state to give the court jurisdiction of the respondent or his property and shall 
request the court to set a time and place for a hearing. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-18, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-19. Further duties of court and county attorney of 
this state as the responding state. 
(1) The county attorney shall, on his own initiative, use all means at his 
disposal to trace the respondent or his property and if, due to inaccuracies of 
the petition or otherwise, the court cannot obtain jurisdiction, the county 
attorney shall inform the court of what he has done and request the court to 
continue the case pending receipt of more accurate information or an amended 
petition from the court in the initiating state. 
(2) If the respondent or his property is not found in the county and the 
county attorney discovers by any means that the respondent or his property 
may be found in another county of this state or in another state, he shall so 
inform the court and thereupon the clerk of the court shall forward the 
documents received from the court in the initiating state to a court in the other 
county or to a court in the other state or to the information agency or other 
proper official of the other state with a request that it forward the documents 
to the proper court. Thereupon both the court of the other county and any court 
of this state receiving the documents and the county attorney have the same 
powers and duties under this act as if the documents had been originally 
addressed to them. When the clerk of a court of this state retransmits 
documents to another court, he shall notify forthwith the court from which the 
documents came. 
(3) If the county attorney has no information as to the whereabouts of the 
obligor or his property, he shall so inform the initiating court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-19, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-20. Procedure. 
The court shall conduct proceedings under this act in the manner prescribed 
by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of duty of support claimed. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-20, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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77-31-21. Petitioner absent from responding state — Con-
tinuance. 
If the petitioner is absent from the responding state and the respondent 
presents evidence which constitutes a defense, the court shall continue the 
case for further hearing and the submission of evidence by both parties. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-21, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-22. Evidence of husband and wife. 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications be-
tween husband and wife are inapplicable to proceedings under this act. 
Husband and wife are competent witnesses and may be compelled to testify to 
any relevant matter, including marriage and parentage. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-22, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-23. Rules of evidence. 
In any hearing under this law, the court shall be bound by the same rules of 
evidence that bind the district court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-23, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-24. Order of support. 
If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support, it may order the 
respondent to furnish support or reimbursement therefor and subject the 
property of the respondent to such order. The court and county attorney of any 
county where the obligor is present or has property have the same powers and 
duties to enforce the order as have those of the county where it was first issued. 
If enforcement is impossible or cannot be completed in the county where the 
order was issued, the county attorney shall transmit a certified copy of the 
order to the county attorney of any county where it appears that procedures to 
enforce payment of the amount due would be effective. The county attorney to 
whom the certified copy of the order is forwarded shall proceed with enforce-
ment and report the results of the proceedings to the court first issuing the 
order. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-24, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-25. Court of this state as responding state to trans-
mit copies to initiating state. 
The court of this state when acting as a responding state shall cause to be 
transmitted to the court of the initiating state a copy of all orders of support or 
for reimbursement therefor. 
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History: C. 1963, 77-31-25, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-26. Additional powers of court of this state as re-
sponding state. 
In addition to the foregoing powers, the court of this state when acting as the 
responding state has the power to subject the respondent to such terms and 
conditions as the court may deem proper to assure compliance with its order 
and in particular: 
(1) To require the respondent to furnish recognizance in the form of a 
cash deposit or bond of such character and in such amount as the court 
may deem proper to assure payment of any amount required to be paid by 
the respondent. 
(2) To require the respondent to make payments at specified intervals to 
the clerk of the court and to report personally to such clerk at such times 
as may be deemed necessary. 
(3) To punish the respondent who shall violate any order of the court to 
the same extent as is provided by law for contempt of the court in any 
other suit or proceeding cognizable by the court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-26, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-31-27. Additional duties of court of this state as re-
sponding state. 
The courts of this state, when acting as a responding state, shall have the 
following duties which may be carried out through the clerk of the court: 
(1) Upon the receipt of a payment made by the respondent pursuant to 
any order of the court or otherwise, to transmit the same forthwith to the 
department if the obligee is receiving child support enforcement services 
under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act or otherwise to the court of the 
initiating state; and 
(2) Upon request, to furnish to the department or the court of the 
initiating state a certified statement of all payments made by the respon-
dent. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-27, enacted by L. Security Act, cited in Subsection (1), is codified 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. 
Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the Social 
77-31-28* Duty of department acting as initiating state to 
receive and disburse payments* 
The department, when acting as an initiating state, shall have the duty to 
receive and disburse forthwith all payments made by the respondent or 
transmitted by the court or the Title IV-D agency of the responding state, if the 
obligee is receiving child support enforcement services under Title IV-D of the 
Social Security Act. If not, the court shall assume this duty which may be 
carried out through the clerk of the court. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-31-28, enacted by L. Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. seq. 
Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the Social 
77-31-29. Proceedings not to be stayed. 
No proceeding under this act shall be stayed because of the existence of a 
pending action for divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution or custody 
proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-29, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Divorce decree. case involving same parties and subject matter 
Divorced wife living in California was not as a prior case will be stayed; thus trial court 
required to seek modification of Utah divorce should have determined alimony and support 
decree that did not include provision for pay- issue upon forwarding of petition by California 
ment of alimony or support before initiating court. Maskil v. Green, 25 Utah 2d 187, 479 
proceedings to compel support; this section ere- p.2d 343 (1971). 
ates an exception to general rule that second 
77-31-30. Application of payments. 
No order of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a 
responding state shall supersede any other order of support but the amounts 
for a particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be credited against 
amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under both. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-30, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Conflicting support orders. quent order of Washington court that defen-
Utah court's order that defendant pay $200 dant pay $160 per month; and he owed differ-
per month child support was neither modified, ence upon his return to Utah. Oglesby v. 
vacated, reformed, nor eliminated by subse- Oglesby, 29 Utah 2d 419, 510 P.2d 1106 (1973). 
77-31-31. Effect of participation in proceeding. 
Participation in any proceedings under this act shall not confer upon any 
court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-31, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Visitation rights. jurisdiction to enter an order regarding any 
The district court erred in its order condition- matters other than the support obligation, 
ing child support upon the affording of visita- Charlesworth v. California, 793 P.2d 411 (Utah 
tion rights, because it lacked subject matter Ct. App. 1990). 
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77-31-32. Foreign support orders —Additional remedies. 
If the duty of support is based on a foreign support order, the obligee has the 
additional remedies provided in Sections 77-31-33 through 77-31-37. 
History: C 1953, 77-31-32, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sec-
1980 chu 15, 5 2; 1995, ch. 20, ft 149. tions 77-31-33 through 77-31-37" for "the fol-
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- lowing sections" at the end of the section. 
77-31-33. Registration of foreign support orders. 
The obligee may register the foreign support order in a court of this state in 
the manner, with the effect and for the purposes herein provided. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-33, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2. 
77-31-34. Registry of foreign support orders maintained 
by clerk. 
The clerk of the court shall maintain a registry of foreign support orders in 
which he shall record foreign support orders. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-34, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2. 
# ^^  
77-31-35. Petition for registration of foreign support or-
der. 
The petition for registration shall be verified and shall set forth the amount 
remaining unpaid and a list of any other states in which the support order is 
registered and shall have attached to it a certified copy of the support order 
with all modifications thereof. The foreign support order is registered upon the 
filing of the petition subject only to subsequent order of confirmation. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-35, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2. 
77-31-36. Jurisdiction and procedure. 
The procedure to obtain jurisdiction of the person or property of the obligor 
shall be as provided in civil cases. The obligor may assert any defense available 
to a defendant in an action on a foreign judgment. If the obligor defaults, the 
court shall enter an order confirming the registered support order and 
determining the amounts remaining unpaid. If the obligor appears and a 
hearing is held, the court shall adjudicate the issues including the amounts 
remaining unpaid. 
History: C. 1953, 77-31-36, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2. 
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Effect of payment, acknowledg-
ment, or promise to pay. ~ 
Action barred in another state 
barred here. 





Separate trial of statute of limi-
tations issue in malpractice 
actions. 
Statute of limitations — Asbes-
tos damages. 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-1; 1987, ch. 19, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Affirmative defense, 
statute of limitations as, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P. 
Antitrust Act actions, § 76-10-925. 
Cities and towns, claims and actions against, 
§§ 11-14-21. 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 78-12-29, 
78-12-30. 
Collection agency bond, actions on, § 12-1-3. 
Common carriers, claims and actions for loss 
or damage to freight, § 54-3-16. 
Contracts for sale of goods, § 70A-2-725. 
Counties, claims and actions against, 
§§ 17-15-10, 17-15-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 
78-12-30. 
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et 
seq. 
Improvement district proceedings, § 17A-3-
330. 
Insurance contracts, actions on, 
§ 31A-21-313. 
Marketable record titles, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Municipal bond proceedings, § 11-14-21. 
Pleading statute of limitations, Rule 9(h), 
U.R.C.P. 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
Protest of solicitation or award of public con-
tract, § 63-56-55. 
Public works programs, contesting ordi-
nances and bonds, § 55-3-16. 
Securities Act, §§ 61-1-4, 61-1-22. 
State, actions against, §§ 63-30-12, 
63-30-15. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 




—Applicable foreign law. 
Nature and extent of right. 
—Legal. 




—Failure to plead. 
When statute begins to run. 
—Commencement of another action. 
—Existence of cause of action. 
—Particular proceedings. 
—Relation back. 
Amendment to complaint. 
—Remediability of claim. 
—Service of summons. 
Applicability of section. 
—Administrative discipline. 
In the absence of specific legislative author-
ity, civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable 
to administrative disciplinary proceedings. 
Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Discovery. 
The discovery rule has no application when 
an action easily could have been filed between 
the date of discovery and the end of the limita-
tion period. Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen 
Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987). 
Escheat proceedings. 
—Applicable foreign law. 
Five-year limitation period within which 
heirs must claim, estate to ureveat ita escheat 
after death of intestate without apparent heirs 
is subject to provisions of treaty between 
United States and country of alien intestate, 
requiring actual notice to consular authorities 
of intestate's death without apparent heirs. In 
re Apostolopouios' Estate, 68 Utah 344, 250 P. 
469, 253 P. 1117, 48 A.L.R. 1322 (1926). 
Nature and extent of right. 
—Legal. 
The statute of limitations governs legal title, 
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-20; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 156. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted ''Sec-
tions 78-12-18 and 78-12-19* for 'The two pre-
ceding sections" at the beginning of the section; 
subdivided the existing single sentence into two 
sentences by deleting "but all" following "ac-
crues" and adding "All" before "such"; and sub-
stituted "Section 78-12-21" for "the next preced-
ing section" at the end of the section. 
ARTICLE 2 
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
78-12-22. Within eight years. 
Within eight years an action: 
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of 
any state or territory within the United States. 
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide 
support or maintenance for dependent children. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26; 1992, 
ch. 30, § 177. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, made stylistic 
changes. 
78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real prop-
erty — Instrument in writing — Distribution of 
criminal proceeds to victim. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of contract. 
Running of statute. 
—Reformation of agreements. 
Breach of contract. 
When a contract for the sale of land provided 
no remedy in the event of the seller's default or 
refusal to perform, the buyer's right to recover 
money paid was not founded upon a written 
instrument, but rather upon an implied right to 
recover; therefore, the four-year statute of limi-
tations in § 78-12-25(1) applied, and the trial 
court erred in concluding that the buyers claim 
fell within the six-year period of this section. 
McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Running of statute. 
—Reformation of agreements. 
Claim for reformation of 1975 agreements 
was barred by Subsection (2) of this section, 
requiring actions based on a written contract to 
be brought within six years. United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 R2d 
880 (Utah 1993). 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Discovery rule. 
Equitable actions. 





Relation back of complaints. 




Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Claim against parties for inducing, aiding, 
and abetting mining corporations in breaching 
their fiduciary duty was dismissed since the 
acts complained of occurred more than four 
years prior to the instigation of the lawsuit. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-36 
his residence, and that proceedings under the limitations is not tolled by absence from the 
Nonresident Motorist Act are the only Utah state. Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 
proceedings in which the applicable statute of (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937, 945. 
km. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 154 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
100. 
A.L.R. — Tolling of statute of limitations 
during absence from state as affected by fact 
that party claiming benefit of limitations re-
mained subject to service during absence or 
nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=» 
84, 85. 
78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real 
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of 
jnsgority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of 
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
& History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
8upp., 104-12-36; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16; 1987, 
feh. 19, § 5. 
^Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6 
jirovides that the amendment to this section, 
deleting a reference to imprisonment as a dis-
ability, applies only to causes of action that 
ferise after April 27, 1987 and has no retroac-
tive application. 
| Cross-References. — Actions to recover 
property, effect of disability, § 78-12-21. 
Age of majority, § 15-2-1. 
Disaffirmance of contract 
§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3. 
Guardians of incapacitated 
by minor, 
persons, 
§ 75-5-301 et seq. 
Medical malpractice actions, limitations pro-
iainna onniinakiA **egardles8 of disability, v s o s applicable
§ 78-14-4. 
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions 
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Rental illness. 
(Notice of claim requirements. 
j*Failure to file. 
-Action barred. 






atifFs incest-related psychological prob-
r were not a mental illness that would toll 
statute of limitations. Whatcott v. 
fcatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Bee of claim requirements. 
| | i iure to rile. 
^Action barred. 
Pus section had no application to action 
against town which was barred because of fail-
ure to file claim. Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924). 
This section does not operate to extend statu-
tory time for filing claims against a city until 
after a minor claimant has obtained majority. 
Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 
P.2d 1335 (1972). 
Specific requirement of timely notice to city 
of claim against it takes precedence over provi-
sion tolling statute of limitations during mi-
nority of a child; failure to comply with statu-
tory notice provisions barred action against 
city hospital by parents on behalf of newborn 
infant. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 
799 (Utah 1975). 
——Action not barred. 
Notice of claim requirements in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-13, are 
tolled by this section during the period of mi-
nority; therefore, failure to comply with such 
notice requirements by a minor does not bar 
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agreement was made, (2) by the debtor/obligor 
of the settlement agreement (or by a third 
party at the debtor's direction), and (3) the pay-
ment was made to the creditor under the set-
tlement agreement Butcher v Gilroy, 744 
P.2d 311 (Utah Ct App 1987) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 325 et seq 
C.J.S. — 54 C J S Limitations of Actions 
§ 261 
AX.R. — Promises to settle or perform as 
estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44 
AL.R3d 482 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-45. 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section 
—Counterclaim 
Act occurring in other state 
Choice of laws 
—Utah court 
Exception to section 
—Assignee of resident's claim 
^rState resident 
—;-— Accrual of cause of action 
Applicability of section. 
v iThis section is a general provision applying 
td causes of action that arise in a different 
•tate and are not reduced to judgment Pan En-
ergy v Martin, 813 P2d 1142 (Utah 1991) 
Counterclaim. 
r-Act occurring in other state. 
Where defendant's counterclaim for mal-
practice occurring in Idaho was barred by the 
jWaho statute of limitation, it would be barred 
here under this section Lindsay v Woodward, 
MJtah 2d 183, 299 P2d 619 (1956) 
Pjoice of laws. 
TjfJtah court. 
Rla^wrongful death action by Utah resident 
Verbal agreement. 
A verbal agreement or new promise based 
upon a prior agreement barred by statute 
comes within this section Whitehill v Lowe, 
10 Utah 419, 37 P 589 (1894) (decided under 
prior law) 
Promises or attempts by seller to repair 
goods as tolling statute of limitations for 
breach of warranty, 68 A L R 3d 1277 
Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions «» 
146 
against Colorado residents, in which Utah 
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court 
applied Utah law on matter concerning the 
statute of limitations, including the tolling 
thereof Rhoades v Wright, 622 P 2d 343 (Utah 
1980), cert denied, 454 U S 897, 102 S Ct 
397, 70 L Ed 2d 212 (1981) 
Exception to section. 
—Assignee of resident's claim. 
Resident of Utah, who acquired claim upon 
which he based his right of action by virtue of 
assignment after cause of action had accrued 
thereon, did not come within exception to this 
section Lawsonv Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P 520 
(1908) 
—State resident 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Only those persons who are Utah residents 
as of the date their cause of action arises come 
within the exception to this section Allen v 
Greyhound Lines, 583 P 2d 613 (Utah 1978) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here. 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or m a 
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be 
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon 
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who 
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the 
time it accrued. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-27-15. Salaries of public officers subject to garnish-
ment. 
The state of Utah, any county, city, town, district, board of education or other 
subdivision of the state, and any officer, board or institution, having in its 
possession or under its control any credits or other personal property of, or 
owing any debt to, the defendant in any action, whether as salary or wages, as 
a public official or employee, or otherwise, shall be subject to attachment, 
garnishment, and execution under such rights, remedies, and procedure as are 
or may be made applicable to attachment, garnishment, and execution, 
respectively, in other cases, except as provided in Section 78-27-16. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "pro-
Supp., 104-27-8; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 163. vided in Section 78-27-16" for "in the next 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- section provided* at the end of the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS earnings for purposes of the Consumer Credit 
XT Protection Act and U.R.C.R 64D(dXvii), it was 
Nonpublic employee.
 n o t g u b j e c t to ihe limitations on garnishment 
Tax refund. contained in those ^ provisions; a bank that ob-
Nonpublic employee. tained a judgment against plaintiff properly 
This section authorizes the State Tax Com- obtained a writ of garnishment that directed 
mission to comply with a writ of garnishment of the Utah State Tax Commission to attach 
a state tax refund owing to nonpublic employ- plaintiff's state tax refund. Funk v. State Tax 
ees. Funk v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 818 Comm'n, 839 P.2d 818 (Utah 1992). 
(Utah 1992). 
Tax refund. 
Since a state tax refund was not disposable 
78-27-21. Effect of failure to file certificate — Service of 
process upon nonresident. 
Whenever any such nonresident doing business as provided in Section 
78-27-20 shall fail to file such certificate, or such manager, superintendent, or 
agent designated in such certificate cannot be found within the state of Utah, 
service of process upon such nonresident in any action arising out of the 
conduct of his business may be made by serving any person employed by or 
acting as agent for such nonresident. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 20, § 3; C. 1943, tion 78-27-20" for "the preceding section" near 
Supp.9104-27-15; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 164. the beginning of the section and made stylistic 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- changes, 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sec-
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submit-
ting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen 
or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the 
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim 
arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
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(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this 
state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within 
this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child 
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state 
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a 
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had 
no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives 
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity 
for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, 5 3; 1983, ch. 
160, 9 1; 1987, ch. 35, § 1; 1992, ch. 277, 
i 247. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted "Sec-
tion 16-10a-1501" for "Section 16-10-102" in the 
introductory paragraph. 









Texas auto dealer's intentional misrepresen-
tation of mileage on a truck eventually sold in 
Utah brought the dealer under Subsection (3) 
of this section, but exercise of jurisdiction was 
nevertheless improper because dealer's con-
tacts with state were not sufficient to satisfy 
due process requirements. Clements v. Tbmball 
Ford, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 202 (D. Utah 1993). 
Transaction of any business. 
Negotiations within state by nonresident's 
agents concerning the sale of a Utah business, 
visits by the nonresident to assist in the nego-
tiations, and an agreement in Utah that the 
nonresident would purchase the business made 
a sufficient showing of the nonresident's trans-
action of business within this state for the court 
to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Rad-
cliffe v. Akhaven, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
—Minimal contacts. 
A Texas manufacturer's sending a service 
representative to Utah did not establish suffi-
cient minimum contacts for the assertion of 
specific personal jurisdiction where its contacts 
in Utah were wholly unrelated to the cause of 
action asserted against it. Argueilo v. Industrial 
Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 
1992). 
A Texas manufacturer could not have reason-
ably anticipated being brought into court in 
Utah when it sold no finger jointing machines 
in Utah and it did not seek to serve the Utah 
market for finger jointing machines through 
either sales representatives or advertising; the 
machine that was the subject of plaintiffs suit 
was sold to an ultimate buyer m California and 
resale of the machine m Utah was wholly 
unforeseeable. Argueilo v. Industrial Wood-
working Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in Recovery Processes IntT, Inc. v. 
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 857 F. Supp. 863 (D. 
Utah 1994). 
78-27-33. Statement of injured person — When inadmis-
sible as evidence. 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written or 
oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while 
this person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of injuries 
sustained in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a person 
whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-l 
78-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 14. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchhne following § 78-45-1. 
Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68. 
CHAPTER 45a 












Obligations of the father. 
Enforcement. 
Limitation on recovery from the 
father. 
Limitations on recovery from 
father's estate. 
Remedies. 
Time of trial. 
Paternity action — Jury trial. 
Authority for blood tests. 











, Obligations of the father. 
Compensation of expert wi 
nesses. 





Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title. 
Operation of act. 
The father of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to 
the same extent as the father of a child born within marriage, whether or not 
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy 
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral 
expenses for the child. For purposes of child support collection, a child born 
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other 
than her husband if that paternity has been established. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1; 1990, ch. 
245, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, substituted 
"outside of marriage" for "out of wedlock" in 
both sentences and "within marriage" for "in 
wedlock" in the first sentence, added "For pur-
poses of child support collection" and the clause 
beginning "if* at the end in the second sen-
tence, and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Public support of chil-
dren, §§ 62A-11-301 to 62A-11-332. 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
§ 78-45-1 et seq. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for reimbursement. 
—Collateral estoppel. 
—Costs. 
Action to establish paternity. 
—Attorney fees. 
—Statute of limitations. 
Tolling. 
Cause of action for support. 
Custody rights. 
—Acknowledgment of paternity. 
Right to tnal by jury. 
Action for reimbursement. 
—Collateral estoppel. 
Where, in a paternity action brought for re-
imbursement of money provided for the benefit 
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of a child allegedly fathered bv defendant the 
district court tound that the state was barred 
from asserting its claim by the doctrine of res 
judicata because of a prior default entered 
against the child's mother for failure to answer 
interrogatories, it was held that since the de-
fendant's cause of action against the mother 
was different from that of the state under the 
Uniform Act on Paternity, the issue involved 
collateral estoppel, and because none of the 
tests to apply collateral estoppel had been met, 
res judicata had no application to the case 
State ex rei State Dept of Social Servs v 
Ruscetta, 742 P2d 114 (Utah Ct App 1987) 
—Costs. 
The Uniform Act on Paternitv makes no pro-
vision for an award of costs against the state in 
an action tor reimbursement btate e\ rei 
State Dep t of Social Servs v Ruscetta 7 12 
P2d 114 (Utah Ct App 1987) 
Action to establish paternity. 
—Attorney fees. 
This act makes no provision for awarding at-
torney fees to the mother in an action to estab-
lish paternitv Zito v Butler, 584 P 2d 868 
(Utah 1978), overruled on grounds, Borland v 
Chandler, 733 P 2d 144 (Utah 1987) 
—Statute of limitations. 
Tolling. 
Any statute limiting the time within which a 
paternity action must be commenced under the 
Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled for all statu-
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v Mitchell 
Indigent Paternitv Defendants Right to Coun-
sel, 1982 Utah L Rev 933 
Comment. Husband Notification for Abor-
tion in Utah A Patronizing Problem, 1986 
Utah L Rev 609 
Note, Establishing Paternitv Through HLA 
Testing Utah Standards for Admissibility, 
1988 Utah L Rev 717 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L 
Rev 166 
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adop-
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in 
Utah, 1989 Utah L Rev 859 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, 
J WF v Schoolcraft The Husbands Rights to 
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law, 
1989 B Y U L Rev 955 
torily qualified plaintiffs during the period of 
the child's minority Szarak v Sandoval 636 
P2d 1082 (Utah 1981) 
Cause of action for support. 
A minor child via her guardian ad litem 
has standing to maintain a cause of action 
against her father for support Fauver v 
Hansen, 803 P 2d 1275 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
Custody rights. 
—Acknowledgment of paternitv. 
Father who publicly acknowledged his pater-
nity had right to custody of his illegitimate 
child, second only to mother s right, so that it 
was improper for ]uvenile court to dismiss peti-
tion tor custody and thereby terminate father s 
parental right without hearing to determine 
whether he was tit and proper person btate ex 
rei Babv Girl M. 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P 2d 
1013, 45 ALR3d 206 (1970) 
Under * 78-45-4 1, a stepparent has the obli-
gation of support to the same extent as a natu-
ral parent so long as the stepparent s marriage 
to the natural parent continues State ex rei 
J W F , 799 P2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
Right to trial by jury. 
Since there is no inherent constitutional 
right to a trial by jury in paternity proceedings 
in this state and the Legislature has not pro-
vided for such a right by statute, the defen-
dant, a putative father, had no right to a trial 
by jury Hyatt v Hill, 714 P 2d 299 (Utah 
1986) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am Jur 2d Bastards 
* 68 
C.J.S. — 10 C J S Bastards * 18 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of puta-
tive fathers promise to support or provide for 
illegitimate child, 20 A L R 3d 500 
Paternity proceedings right to jury trial, 51 
A L.R 4th 565 
Rights and obligations resulting from 
human artificial insemination, 83 A L R 4th 
295 
Admissibility or compellability of blood test 
to establish testee s nonpaternity for purpose of 
challenging testee's parental rights, 87 
A L R 4th 572 
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78-45a-2. Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, puta-
tive father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the 
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same 
or other proceedings: 
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or 
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, educa-
tion, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158. § 2; 1990, ch. 
245, § 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23. 1990, inserted "puta-
tive father" in the first sentence and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-
ANALYSIS 
Estoppel and laches. 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
Discretion of court. 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
Estoppel and laches. 
Under appropriate circumstances, laches 
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
A paternity action brought six years after 
the birth of the child was not barred by laches, 
where defendant made no factual showing to 
support his argument that he was prejudiced 
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Where child was conceived while mother was 
married to her first husband and born while 
she was married to her second husband, the 
child was legitimate whichever husband was 
the father, and testimony by mother that dis-
puted second husbands fatherhood and sup-
ported first husband's fatherhood would not 
iUegitimize the child and was properly admis-
sible in paternity action against first husband. 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982). 
sions bv Department of Human Services, 
§ 62A-1-111. 
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties 
of Department of Human Services in collecting 
child support, § 62A-11-104. 
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to 
62A-11-332. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
While due process does not require Utah to 
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who 
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be 
some complicated paternity suits in which the 
risks of error would be high enough that the 
presumption against the right to appointed 
counsel would be overcome; given the avail-
ability and quality of the blood tests, there is 
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the 
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Discretion of court. 
Due process of law does not require that all 
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity 
actions must always be appointed counsel; 
whether due process requires the appointment 
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discre-
tion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d 
1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Standard of proof. 
— Preponderance of evidence. 
The applicable standard of proof where pa-
ternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing 
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Stan-
dards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step-
parents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by 
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
§ 74 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Death of putative father as pre-
cluding action for determination of paternity 
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188. 
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bas-
tardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685. 
Necessity or propriety of appointment of in-
dependent guardian for child who is subject of 
paternity proceedings, 70 A.L.R.4th 1033. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <3= 
30 et seq. 
78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father. 
The fathers liability for past education and necessary support are limited to 
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3. 
Cross-References. — Limitation of action 
for support or maintenance of dependent chil-
dren, § 78-12-22. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statute of limitations. 
—Tolling. 
While any statute limiting the time within 
which a paternity action must be commenced 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled 
for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during 
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of 
child support is still limited by this section. 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Clark v. Jeter. Equal Protection Versus Stat-
utes of Limitation in Paternity Actions, 15 J. 




2d. -- 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
Key Numbers. 
35. 
— Illegitimate children «=» 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are 
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be pay-
able for dependency under other laws. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
act/' as used in this section, means Laws 1965, 
ch. 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to 
78-45a-17. 
Cross-References. — Civil liability for sup-
port, Chapter 45 of this title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. 
§ 127. 35. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
Illegitimate children 
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78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all 
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and 
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses 
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All reme-
dies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available 
for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the 
state Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or 
in its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to 
enforce that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the depart-
ment, all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable 
to this chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Depart-
ment of Human Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the 
county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that 
department. 
History: L. 1966, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, 
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
"Human Services" for "Social Services" twice 
in Subsection (2). 
Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
'Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act — The Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act, referred to in the 
last sentence in Subsection (1), is Chapter 31 of 
Title 77. 
ANALYSIS 
Interests of mother and state. 
Jurisdiction. 
—Minonty of putative father. 
Powers of the court. 
Interests of mother and state. 
In an action pursuant to the Uniform Act on 
Paternity, the state has a separate interest 
from that of the mother. The state and the 
mother are not in privity because each has sep-
arate interests and legal rights over which the 
other has no control. State ex rel. State Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah 
Ct App. 1987). 
Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 45b of this 
title, referred to in Subsection (2), was repealed 
by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407. For present compa-
rable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-301 through 
62A-11-328. 
Cross-References. — Creation of Depart-
ment of Human Services, § 62A-1-102. 
General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1. 
General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1. 
General jurisdiction of district court, 
§ 78-3-4. 
Jurisdiction. 
—Minority of putative father. 
District court, and not the juvenile court, has 
jurisdiction over action brought under the Uni-
form Act on Paternity, when the putative fa-
ther is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't 
of Social Servs. v. Dick, 684 P.2d 42 (Utah 
1984). 
Powers of the court 
The Uniform Paternity Act does not endow a 
district court with subject matter jurisdiction 
to terminate the parent-child relationship or to 
permanently relieve a parent of his or her sup-
port obligations. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 
1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <s=> 
126 et seq. 69 to 71. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards ^ 116, 117. 
78-45a-6. Time of trial. 
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy 
of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be 
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may 
be perpetuated according to the laws of this state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, $ 6. 
Cross-References. — Depositions before ac-
tion, Rule 27, U R.C.P 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children <s= 
123. 55. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 101. 
78-45a-6.5. Paternity action — Jury trial. 
(1) Either party to an action commenced under this chapter may demand a 
jury trial to determine paternity. 
(2) (a) The procedure and law governing a trial by jury under this chapter 
is the same as for a civil jury trial in district court. 
(b) The standard of proof is "by a preponderance of the evidence." 
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by L. came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
1988, ch. 93, $ 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 93 be-
78-45a-7. Authority for blood tests. 
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf 
of any person whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the 
action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order 
the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party 
refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity 
against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests 
of justice so require. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7. Unreasonable searches, Utah Const., Art. I, 
Cross-References. — Blood tests to deter- Sec. 14. 
mine parentage, ^ 78-25-18 to 78-25-23. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note. Establishing Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Stan- * 118. 
dards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards <> 93. 
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A.L.R. — Admissibility or compellability of Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «= 
blood test to establish testee's nonpaternity for 45. 
purpose of challenging testee's parental rights, 
87 A.L.R.4th 572. 
78-45a-8. Selection of experts. 
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as examiners of blood types 
who shall be appointed by the court. The experts shall be called by the court 
as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject to cross-examina-
tion by the parties. Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests have 
been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood 
types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which 
may be offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts 
shall be determined by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8. Court appointment of expert witnesses. Rule 
Cross-References. — Blood test examiner 706, U.R.E. 
as witness, § 78-25-20. 
78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses. 
The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the court shall be 
fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The 
court may order that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such 
times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but 
not appointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not 
be taxed as costs in the action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 9. 
Cross-References. — Judgment and costs, 
Rule 54, U.R.C.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards $ 138. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «= 
75. 
7S-45a-10. Effect of test results. 
If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the 
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of 
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the ex-
perts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted 
upon all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the 
possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is 
within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood 
type. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of blood 
test results, § 78-25-21. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Admissibility. Expert witness. 
To assist the tner-of-fact in understanding 
- H u m a n leukocyte antigen test.
 t h e h h , t e c h n l c a l h u m a n l e u k o c v t e a n t 
This section does not preclude the admusi-
 t e g t r e s u l t s a n d t h e a c c o m p a n y l n g s t a t l s t l c a i 
b.hty of human leukocvte antigen (HLA) test
 b a b l h t l e s t h e r e s u l t s a t e . t h e te 
results if such test otherwise meets the rele- , ,
 r , . . 
. . , , , , ,, . , mony ot a qualified expert witness is required, 
vant legal standards for the admission ot scien- , . f d t t h l H 
tific evidence; such test results were not admit- ,
 A , f ., x , ai in or-
ted as evidence where the party submitting the d e r t 0 ^ y this witness and permit his testi-





 *?\f a d m i t \ f f ^ f j ! * 
foundation at trial for their admissibility. Phil- f ^ ? ^ * ° f S°cml f ?™ V ,Woods . 7 4 4 R 2 d 
lips ex rei. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. 3 1 5 ( U t a h C t APP- 1 9 8 7 ) folding proper foun-
Jackson, 615 P 2d 1228 (Utah 1980) d a t l 0 n s h o w n ) -
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 93 
Paternitv Through HLA Testing: Utah Stan- Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children e= 
dards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 53. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
* 107. 
78-45a-11. Judgment. 
Judgments under this act may be for periodic payments which may vary in 
amount. The court may order payments to be made to the mother or to some 
person, corporation, or agency designated to administer them under the super-
vision of the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, * 11. Cross-References. — Income withholding, 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under ^ 62A-11-401 to 62A-11-414 
same catchlme following ^ 78-45a-4 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children ®= 
* 127. 67. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 111. 
78-45a-12. Security. 
The court may require the alleged father to give bond or other security for 
the payment of the judgment. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, * 12. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children *» 
* 128. 70. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 118 et seq. 
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78-45a-13. Settlement agreements. 
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father is binding only when 
approved by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children *= 
98 et seq. 33. 
C.J.S. — 10 C J.S. Bastards § 40 et seq. 
78-45a-14. Venue. 
An action under this act may be brought in the county where the alleged 
father is present or has property or in the county where the mother resides. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14. Cross-References. — Venue, general provi-
Meaning of "this act." — See note under sions, Chapter 13 of this title, 
same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=> 
76. 37. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 57, 58. 
78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 15. adopting the Uniform Act on Paternity are 
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hamp-
w[t]his act," as used in this section, see note shire, and Rhode Island. 
under same catchline following § 78-45a-4. Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68. 
78-45a-16. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Act on Pater-
nity." 
History: L. 1965, ch. 168, § 16. "[t)his act," as used in this section, see note 
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of under same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
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78-45a-17. Operation of act. 
This act applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock as defined in this act 
where birth occurs after this act takes effect. 
History: J-. 1965, ch. 158, § 17. The term "after this act takes effect" means 
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of after the effective date of Laws 1965, ch 158, 
'[t]his act," appearing throughout this section, i eM May 11, 1965 
see note under same catchline following 
* 78-45a-4 
CHAPTER 45b 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
(Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2; 1987, ch. 161, * 314; 1988, ch. 1, § 407.) 
78-45b-l to 78-45b-25. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals 
^§ 78-45b-l to 78-45b-6. as enacted by Laws 
1975, ch 96, § 1, Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 1, and 
Laws 1985, ch 8, <* 2 and as amended by Laws 
1987, ch. 77, § 3 and Laws 1987, ch 161, 
§§ 309 to 312, relating to common law reme-
dies, definitions, support debt and hearings, ef-
fective January 19,1988 For present compara-
ble provisions, see H 62A-11-301 to 
62A-11-308 
Laws 1987, ch 161, $ 314 repeals 
* 78-45b-6 1, as last amended bv Laws 1983, 
ch. 161, ^ 2, concerning findings in order by 
department and judicial review, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1988 
Laws 1988, ch 1, ^ 407 repeals ^ 78-45b-7 
to 78-45b-21, as enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 96, 
*§ 7, 10, 12, 14 to 18, 20 and 21, Laws 1984 
(S S.), ch 2, *> 1 and Laws 1985, ch 9, § 1 and 
as amended by Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 8, Laws 
1984, ch 14, <> 1, Laws 1984 <S S ), ch. 2, § 2, 
Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch. 151, 
5} 313, relating to hens, final orders, payments 
and charging ail uncollectable support debts, 
effective January 19, 1988 For present compa-
rable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-309 to 
62A-11-321. 
Section 78-45b-22 (L. 1975, ch. 96, § 22), re-
lating to inapplicability of statute of limita-
tions to hens, wage assignment or garnish-
ment, was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2 
Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals ^ 78-45b-23 
to 78-45b-25, as enacted by Laws 1984, ch 13, 
* 5, Laws 1985, ch 13, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch 
77, § 4, relating to medical and dental ex-
penses of dependent children, providing court 
debt information to consumer reporting agen-
cies, and the information received from state 
tax commissioner, effective January 19, 1988 
For present comparable provisions, see 
§§ 62A-11-326 to 62A-11-328. 
CHAPTER 45c 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION 
Section Section 
78-45c-l Purposes — Construction. 78-45c-5 
73-45c-2 Definitions 
78-45c-3 Bases of jurisdiction in this 
state 78-45c-6 
78-45c-4 Persons to be notified and 
heard. 
Service of notice outside state 
— Proof of service — Submis-
sion to jurisdiction. 
Proceedings pending elsewhere 
— Jurisdiction not exercised 
— Inquiry to other state — 
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isal to provide for the support and maintenance of the wife, child or 
Idren is prima facie evidence that the desertion, neglect or refusal is 
Ifiil. (Laws 1915, ch. 72, § 6; C S. 1920, § 5036; R S 1931, § 32-808; C S. 
5, § 9-808; W.S. 1957, § 20-76; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. WS 1957, 
0-3-104.) 
ross references. — As to husband and 
as witnesses in civil and criminal cases 
rally, see 5§ 1-12-101 through 1-12-104 
epealing c lauses . — Laws 1915, ch 72, 
repealed all laws and parts of laws in 
lict therewith 
Law reviews. — For note, "Spouse's Testi-
mony in Criminal Cases," see 19 Wyo L.J. 35 
(1964) 
For discussion of husband wife testimonial 
privilege and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
see XII Land 6 Water L Rev 601 (1977) 
10-3-105. 
epealed by Laws 1986, ch 67, § 2. 
- -fc-ence.. - A. „
 e n f o r e e m e n t o f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ ^ 
I support orders, see $ 20-6-201 et seq 
litor's notes. — This section, which de-
I from Laws 1981, ch 168. 5 1, related to 
enforcement of child support orders For 
>rovisions of this section as last amended, 
the 1985 cumulative supplement 
ch 67, i 3 provides "Nothing in this act shall 
be construed as invalidating any execution 
against income ordered pursuant to W S 
20-3-105 prior to the effective date of this act " 
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT 
CHAPTER 4 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Sec 
20-4 101 Purpose 
20-4-102 Definitions 
20-4-103 Remedies cumulative 
20-4 104 Duties of support binding regardless 
of residency 
20 4 105 Reciprocal surrender of person fail-
ing to support 
20-4-106 Prerequisites to demand for surren-
der of obligor 
20-4-107 Duties of support, presumption 
20 4 108 Action for reimbursement by state 
furnishing support 
20-4-109 Proceeding for enforcement, limita-
tion on defense 
20-4-110 Jurisdiction of proceeding for en-
forcement 
20-4-111 Complaint, contents, filing 
20-4 112 Representation of obligee 
20-4-113 Representation of obligee, minor 
20-4-114 Complaint forwarded to responding 
state 
20-4 115 Payment of fees and costs 
20-4-116 Obligor may be detained, conditions 
20-4-117 Child support enforcement section 
designated state information sec-
tion, duties 
20-4-118 Case docketed in responding state, 
duty of prosecuting attorney 
20-4-119 Duty to locate obligor; forward com-
plaint to another court 
20-4-120 Continuance of hearing, taking of 
depositions, conditions 
20-4-121 Obligor may be compelled to testify, 
immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion, exception 
20-4 122 Privilege of husband and wife inap-
plicable 
Sec 
20-4-123 Proceedings governed by rules of 
evidence, modification of support 
orders 
20 4-124 Property of obligor subject to order 
for support, order may be for 
warded to another county for en-
forcement 
20-4-125 Copy of support order forwarded to 
initiating state 
20-4-126 Court may impose conditions to 
assure compliance 
20-4-127 Paternity in question, adjudication 
20 4 128 Duties of responding court 
20 4-129 Receipt and disbursement of pay-
ments by initiating court 
20 4-130 Responding court not to stay pro-
ceeding or refuse hearing, order of 
support pendente lite 
20-4 131 Support order not superseded by 
order of another court 
20-4-132 Enforcement of support within Wyo-
ming 
20-4-133 Attorney general may appeal or 
cause an appeal in public interest 
20-4-134 Registration of foreign support or 
ders, prosecuting attorney to as 
sist obligee 
20-4 135 Registration of foreign support or-
ders, supporting documents re-
quired for registration, notice to 
obligor 
20-4-136 Foreign support order subject to 
same defenses and proceedings as 
order from this Btate 
20 4 137 Interpretation 
20-4-138 Short title 
Cross references. — As to petition by wife 
for support, see § 20 2-102 As to desertion of 
wife or children, see chapter 3 of this title As 
to wage earner's exemption from garnishment, 
see 5 1-17-411 
Law reviews. — For article, "The Uniform 
Enforcement of Support Act in Wyoming," see 
8 Wyo L J 237 
Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J S. references. 
— 23 Am Jur 2d Desertion and Nonsupport 
55 117 to 149 
Construction and application of state stat-
utes providing for reciprocal enforcement of 
duty to support dependents, 42 ALR2d 768 
Obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident par-
ent in filiation or support proceeding, 76 
ALR3d 708 
Determination of paternity of child as within 
scope of proceeding under Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act, 81 ALR3d 1175 
Wife's liability for necessaries furnished hus-
band, 11 ALR4th 1160 
Authority of court, upon entering default 
judgment, to make orders for child custody or 
support which were not specifically requested 
in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 ALR5th 863 
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§ 20-4-101. Purpose. 
The purposes of this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] are to improve and 
extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support. (Laws 
1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-106; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-105; Laws 1977, 
ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-101.) 
Quoted in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213 
(Wyo. 1985). 
§ 20-4-102. Definitions. 
(a) As used in this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138]: 
(i) "Court" means the district court of this state and when the context 
requires means the court of any other state as defined in a substantially 
similar reciprocal law; 
(ii) "Duty of support" means a duty of support imposed or imposable 
by law, order, decree or judgment of any court, whether interlocutory or 
final or whether incidental to an action for divorce, separation, separate 
maintenance or otherwise, and includes the duty to pay arrearages of 
support past due and unpaid; 
(iii) "Governor" means any person performing the functions of gover-
nor or the executive authority of any state covered by this act; 
(iv) "Initiating state" means a state in which a proceeding pursuant to 
this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced. "Initiating 
court'' means the court in which a proceeding is commenced; 
(v) "Law" means both common and statutory law; 
(vi) "Obligee" means a person, state or political subdivision to whom a 
duty of support is owed, or that has commenced a proceeding for 
enforcement of an alleged duty of support or for registration of a support 
order. It is immaterial if the person to whom a duty of support is owed is a 
recipient of public assistance; 
(vii) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support or against 
whom a proceeding for the enforcement of a duty of support or 
registration of a support order is commenced; 
(viii) "Prosecuting attorney" means the public official in the appropri-
ate place who has the duty to enforce criminal laws relating to the failure 
to provide for the support of any person; 
(ix) "Register" means to file in the registry of foreign support orders; 
(x) "Registering court" means any court of this state in which a 
support order of a rendering state is registered; 
(xi) "Rendering state" means a state in which the court has issued a 
support order for which registration is sought or granted in the court of 
another state; 
(xii) "Responding state" means a state in which any responsive 
proceeding pursuant to the proceeding in the initiating state is com-
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menced. "Responding court" means the court in which the responsive 
proceeding is commenced; 
(xiii) "State" includes a state, territory or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and 
any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal 
law is in effect; 
(xiv) "Support order" means any judgment, decree or order of support 
in favor of an obligee whether temporary or final or subject to modifica-
tion, revocation or remission, regardless of the kind of action or 
proceeding in which it is entered. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-107; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-106; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 
1957, § 20-4-102.) 
Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b) 
in this section as it appears in the printed acts. 
§ 20-4-103. Remedies cumulative. 
The remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for 
any other remedies. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-108; Rev. W.S. 
1957, § 20-107; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-103.) 
Right to enforce support orders not ab- enforce its support orders by using its contempt 
rogated. — Adoption of this chapter did not power. Graham v. Fen no, 734 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 
abrogate a plaintiffs right to petition for 1987). 
enforcement or the district court's authority to 
§ 20-4-104. Duties of support binding regardless of resi-
dency. 
Duties of support arising under the law of this state, when applicable under 
W.S. 20-4-107, bind the obligor present in this state regardless of the presence 
or residence of the obligee. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-109; Rev. 
W.S. 1957, § 20-108; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-104.) 
§ 20-4-105. Reciprocal surrender of person failing to sup-
port. 
(a) The governor of this state may: 
(i) Demand of the governor of another state the surrender of a person 
found in that state who is charged criminally in this state with failing to 
provide for the support of any person; or 
(ii) Surrender on demand by the governor of another state a person 
found in this state who is charged criminally in that state with failing to 
provide for the support of any person. 
(b) Provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent with this act 
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] apply to the demand even if the person whose 
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time of the 
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commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom. The demand, oath and 
any proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need not state or show 
that the person whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice or at the 
time of the commission of the crime was in the demanding state. (Laws 1973, 
ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-110; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-109; Laws 1977, ch. 
152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-105.) 
I^ aw reviews. — "Wyoming Extradition," 
11 Wyo. LJ . 61. 
§ 20-4-106. Prerequisites to demand for surrender of obli-
gor. 
(a) Before making demand upon the governor of another state for 
surrender of a person charged criminally in this state with failing to provide 
for the support of a person, the governor of this state may require any 
prosecuting attorney of this state to show that at least sixty (60) days prior 
thereto the obligee initiated proceedings for support under this act 
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] or that any proceeding would be of no avail. 
(b) If, under a substantially similar act, the governor of another state 
makes a demand upon the governor of this state for surrender of a person 
charged criminally in that state with failure to provide for the support of a 
person, the governor may require any prosecuting attorney to investigate the 
demand and report to him whether proceedings for support have been 
initiated or would be effective. If it appears to the governor that a proceeding 
would be effective but has not been initiated he may delay honoring the 
demand for a reasonable time to permit the initiation of a proceeding. 
(c) If proceedings have been initiated and the person demanded has 
prevailed therein, the governor may decline to honor the demand. If the 
obligee prevailed and the person demanded is subject to a support order, the 
governor may decline to honor the demand if the person demanded is 
complying with the support order. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-111; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-110; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
$ 20-4-106.) 
§ 20-4-107. Duties of support; presumption. 
Duties of support are those imposed under the laws of any state where the 
obligor was present for the period during Which support is sought. The obligor 
is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for 
which support is sought until otherwise shown. In determining when a duty of 
support terminates, the age of majority shall be the age of majority of the 
rendering state. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-112; Rev. W.S. 
1957, § 20-111; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-107; Laws 
1987, ch. 87, § 1.) 
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Cross references. — As to criminal prose-
cution for nonsupport of wife or children, see 
ft 20-3-101. 
§ 20-4-108. Action for reimbursement by state furnishing 
sfUpport. 
If a state or political subdivision furnishes support to an individual obligee, 
it has the same right to initiate a proceeding under this act [§§ 20-4-101 
through 20-4-138] as the individual obligee for the purpose of securing 
reimbursement for support furnished and of obtaining continuing support. 
(Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-113; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-112; Laws 
1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-108.) 
§ 20-4-109. Proceeding for enforcement; limitation on de-
fense. 
All duties of support are enforceable by a proceeding under this act 
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] including a proceeding for civil contempt. The 
defense that the parties are immune to suit because of their relationship as 
husband and wife or parent and child is not available to the obligor. (Laws 
1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-114; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-113; Laws 1977, 
ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-109.) 
§ 20-4-110. Jurisdiction of proceeding for enforcement. 
Jurisdiction of any proceeding under this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 
20-4-138] is vested in the district court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-115; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-114; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-4-110.) 
§ 20-4-111. Complaint; contents; filing. 
(a) The complaint shall be verified and shall state the name, and, so far as 
known to the obligee, the address and circumstances of the obligor and the 
persons for whom support is sought, and all other pertinent information. The 
obligee may include in or attach to the complaint any information which may 
help in locating or identifying the obligor. 
(b) The complaint may be filed in the appropriate court of any state in 
which the obligee resides. The court shall not decline or refuse to accept and 
forward the complaint on the ground that it should be filed with some other 
court of this or any other state where there is pending another action for 
divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus, adoption or 
custody between the same parties or where another court has already issued a 
support order in some other proceeding and has retained jurisdiction for its 
enforcement. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-116; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-115; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-111.) 
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\ 20-4-112. Representation of obligee. 
If this state is acting as an initiating state the prosecuting attorney upon 
he request of the court, the state department of family services, a county 
ommissioner, an overseer of the poor or other public assistance director shall 
epresent the obligee, in any proceeding under this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 
KM-138]. If the prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses to represent the 
bligee, the attorney general may order him to comply with the request of the 
ourt or may undertake the representation. (Laws 1973, ch. 165, § 1; W.S. 
957, S 20-117; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-116; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 
957, S 20-4-112; Laws 1991, ch. 161, * 3.) 
20-4-113. Representation of obligee; minor. 
A complaint on behalf of a minor obligee may be executed and filed by a 
erson having legal custody of the minor without appointment as guardian ad 
item. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-118; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
20-117; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-113.) 
Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references, party to civil suit for negligence in connection 
- Liability of guardian ad litem for infant with suit, 14 ALR5th 929. 
20-4-114. Complaint forwarded to responding state. 
If the initiating court finds that the complaint sets forth facta from which it 
lay be determined that the obligor owes a duty of support and that a court of 
lie responding state may obtain jurisdiction of the obligor or his property, it 
ball so certify and cause three (3) copies of the complaint and its certificate 
nd one (1) copy of this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] to be sent to the 
ssponding court. Certification shall be in accordance with the requirements 
f the initiating state. If the name and address of the responding court is 
nknown and the responding state has an information agency comparable to 
lat established in the initiating state it shall cause the copies to be sent to 
le state information agency or other proper official of the responding state 
ith a request that the agency or official forward them to the proper court and 
lat the court of the responding state acknowledge their receipt to the 
litiating court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20119; Rev. W.S. 
957, § 20-118; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-114.) 
20-4-115. Payment of fees and costs. 
An initiating court shall not require payment of either a filing fee or other 
ists from the obligee but may request the responding court to collect fees and 
«ts from the obligor. A responding court shall not require payment of a 
ling fee or other costs from the obligee but it may direct that all fees and 
>sts requested by the initiating court and incurred in this state when acting 
i a responding state, including fees for filing of pleadings, service of process, 
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seizure of property, stenographic or duplication service or other service 
supplied to the obligor be paid in whole or in part by the obligor or by the 
county. These costs or fees do not have priority over amounts due to the 
obligee. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-120; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-119; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-115.) 
§ 20-4-116. Obligor may be detained; conditions. 
(a) If the court of this state believes that the obligor may flee it may: 
(i) AH an initiuting court, request in its certificate that the responding 
court obtain the body of the obligor by appropriate process; or 
(ii) As a responding court, obtain the body of the obligor by appropri-
ate process, and may release him upon his own recognizance or upon his 
giving a bond in an amount set by the court to assure his appearance at 
the hearing. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-121; Rev. W.S. 
1957, § 20-120; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-116.) 
Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b) 
in this section as it appears in the printed acts. 
§ 20-4-117. Child support enforcement section designated 
state information section; duties. 
(a) The child support enforcement section within the department of family 
services is designated as the state information agency under this act 
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138]. It shall: 
(i) Compile a list of the courts and their addresses in this state having 
jurisdiction under this act and transmit it to the state information agency 
of every other state which has adopted this or a substantially similar act. 
Upon the adjournment of each session of the legislature the agency shall 
distribute copies of any amendments to the act and a statement of their 
effective date to all other state information agencies; 
(ii) Maintain a register of lists of courts received from other states and 
transmit copies thereof promptly to every court in this state having 
jurisdiction under this act; and 
(iii) Forward to the court in this state which has jurisdiction over the 
obligor or his property petitions, certificates and copies of the act it 
receives from courts or information agencies of other states. 
(b) If the state information agency does not know the location of the 
obligor or his property in the state and no state location service is available, it 
shall use all means at its disposal to obtain this information, including the 
examination of official records in the state and other sources. 
(c) After the deposit of three (3) copies of the complaint and certificate and 
one (1) copy of the act of the initiating state with the clerk of the appropriate 
court, if the state information agency knows or believes that the prosecuting 
attorney is not prosecuting the case diligently it shall inform the attorney 
general who may undertake the representation. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; 
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3 1957, § 20-122; Rev W S 1957, § 20-121, Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev 
3 1957, § 20-4-117; Laws 1984, ch. 51, § 2; 1991, ch 161, § 3 ) 
50-4-118. Case docketed in responding state; duty of 
prosecuting attorney. 
0 After the responding court receives copies of the complaint, certificate 
act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] from the initiating court the clerk of 
court shall docket the case and notify the prosecuting attorney of his 
on. 
>) The prosecuting attorney shall prosecute the case diligently He shall 
s all action necessary in accordance with the laws of this state to enable 
court to obtain jurisdiction over the obligor or his property and shall 
lest the court to set a time and place for a hearing and give notice thereof 
he obligor in accordance with law. 
) If the prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses to represent the obligee, 
attorney general may order him to comply with the request of the court or 
' undertake the representation (Laws 1973, ch 155, § 1; W S 1957, 
1-123; Rev. W S. 1957, § 20-122; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1, Rev W S 1957, 
M-118) 
0-4-119. Duty to locate obligor; forward complaint to 
another court. 
) The prosecuting attorney shall use all means at his disposal to locate 
ibligor or his property, and if because of inaccuracies in the complaint or 
rwise the court cannot obtain jurisdiction the prosecuting attorney shall 
•m the court of what he has done and request the court to continue the 
pending receipt of more accurate information or an amended complaint 
the initiating court. 
i If the obligor or his property is not found in the county and the 
scuting attorney discovers that the obligor or his property may be found 
tother county of this state or in another state, he shall so inform the court, 
eupon the clerk of the court shall forward the documents received from 
ourt in the initiating state to a court in the other county or to a court in 
tther state or to the information agency or other proper official of the 
* state with a request that the documents be forwarded to the proper 
All powers and duties provided by this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 
138] apply to the recipient of the documents so forwarded If the clerk of a 
of this state forwards documents to another court he shall forthwith 
/ the initiating court. 
If the prosecuting attorney has no information as to the location of the 
or or his property, he shall so inform the initiating court. (Laws 1973, ch. 
5 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-124; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-123; Laws 1977, ch. 152, 
Rev. W.S 1957, § 20-4-119.) 
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§ 20-4-120. Continuance of hearing; taking of depositions; 
conditions. 
If the obligee is not present at the hearing and the obligor denies owing the 
duty of support alleged in the petition or offers evidence constituting a 
defense, the court, tipon request of either party, may continue the hearing to 
permit evidence relative to the duty to be adduced by either party by 
deposition or by appearing in person before the court The court may 
designate the judge of the initiating court as a person before whom a 
deposition may be taken (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1, W S 1957, § 20-125; Rev. 
W S 1957, § 20-124; Laws 1977, ch 152, § 1; Rev. W S 1957, § 20-4-120.) 
§ 20-4-121. Obligor may be compelled to testify; immunity 
from criminal prosecution; exception. 
If at the hearing the obligor is called for examination as an adverse party 
and he declines to answer upon the ground that his testimony may tend to 
incriminate him, the court may require him to answer in which event he is 
immune from criminal prosecution with respect to matters revealed by his 
testimony, except for perjury committed in this testimony. (Laws 1973, ch. 
155, § 1; W S 1957, § 20-126, Rev W S 1957, § 20-125; Laws 1977, ch. 152, 
§ 1, Rev W S 1957, § 20-4-121) 
§ 20-4-122. Privilege of husband and wife inapplicable. 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications 
between husband and wife are inapplicable to proceedings under this act 
[§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138]. Husband and wife are competent witnesses 
and may be compelled to testify to any relevant matter including marriage 
and parentage (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1;WS 1957, § 20-127, Rev. W S 1957, 
§ 20-126; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W S 1957, § 20-4*122 ) 
Cross references — For constitutional Law reviews — For discussion of husband 
provision as to self incrimination, see art 1, wife testimonial privilege and the Federal 
( ll.Wyo Const As to privileged communica- Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L 
tions and acts generally, see 5 1 12-101 Rev 601 (1977) 
§ 20-4-123. Proceedings governed by rules of evidence; 
modification of support orders. 
In any hearing for the civil enforcement of this act [§§20-4-101 through 
20-4-138] the court is governed by the rules of evidence applicable in a civil 
court action in the district court. If the action is based on a support order 
issued by another court, a certified copy of the order shall be received as 
evidence of the duty of support, subject only to defenses available to an obligor 
with respect to paternity or to a defendant in an action or a proceeding to 
enforce a foreign money judgment A support order issued by another court is 
not subject to retroactive modification except the order may be modified with 
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ect to any period during which a petition for modification is pending, but 
from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the 
jor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. In 
case in which child support has been ordered to be paid to the clerk of a 
ming court, any periodic payment or installment under the provisions of 
decree concerning maintenance is on the date it is due a judgment by 
ation of law. The determination or enforcement of a duty of support oWed 
te (1) obligee is unaffected by any interference by another obligee with 
£ of custody or visitation granted by a court. (Laws 1973, ch 155, § 1; 
1957, § 20-128; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-127; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. 
1957, § 20-4-123; Laws 1987, ch. 87, § 1; 1988, ch. 26, § 1.) 
»iied in Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 
TVyo. 1985). 
>-4-124. Property of obligor subject to order for sup-
port; order may be forwarded to another 
county for enforcement. 
If the responding court finds a duty of support, it may order the obligor 
nish support or reimbursement therefor and subject the property of the 
>r to the order. Support orders shall require that payments be made to 
erk of the court of the responding state. Each support order under this 
ti shall provide for a statement of the obligor's address and social 
ty number if known, the name and address of the obligor's employer and 
imes and birthdates of each child to whom the order relates. The court 
>rder the obligor to notify the clerk of court in writing within fifteen (15) 
f any change of address or employment. In any proceeding to enforce the 
any required notice or pleading shall be served as provided by the 
ing Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon entry of any support order the court 
tlso enter an income withholding order as provided by W.S. 20-6-204. 
The court and prosecuting attorney of any county in which the obligor 
ent or has property have the same powers and duties to enforce the 
s have those of the county in which it was first issued. If enforcement is 
ible or cannot be completed in the county in which the order was 
the prosecuting attorney shall send a certified copy of the order to the 
iting attorney of any county in which it appears that proceedings to 
the order would be effective. The prosecuting attorney to whom the 
d copy of the order is forwarded shall proceed with enforcement and 
he results of the proceedings to the court first issuing the order. (Laws 
i. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-129; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-128; Laws 1977, 
§ 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-124; Laws 1987, ch. 87, § 1; 1989, ch. 182, 
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§ 20-4-125. Copy of support order forwarded to initiating 
state. 
The responding court shall cause a copy of all support orders to be sent to 
the initiating court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-130; Rev. W.S. 
1957, S 20-129; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-125.) 
§ 20-4-126. Court may impose conditions to assure compli-
ance. 
(a) In addition to the foregoing powers a responding court may subject the 
obligor to any terms and conditions proper to assure compliance with its 
orders and in particular to: 
(i) Require the obligor to furnish a cash deposit or a bond of a 
character and amount to assure payment of any amount due; 
(ii) Require the obligor to report personally and to make payments at 
specified intervals to the clerk of the court; and 
(iii) Punish under the power of contempt the obligor who violates any 
order of the court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-131; Rev. 
W.S. 1957, § 20-130; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-4-126.) 
§ 20-4-127. Paternity in question; adjudication. 
If the obligor asserts as a defense that he is not the father of the child for 
whom support is sought and it appears to the court that the defense is not 
frivolous, and if both of the parties are present at the hearing or the proof 
required in the case indicates that the presence of either or both of the parties 
is not necessary, the court shall adjudicate the paternity issue pursuant to 
W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. Otherwise the court shall continue the 
hearing until the paternity issue has been adjudicated. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, 
§ 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-132; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-131; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; 
Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-127; Laws 1987, ch. 87, § 1.) 
Cross references. — As to process, and 
service and filing of pleadings and other pa-
pers, see Rules 4 and 5, W.R.C.P. 
Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b) 
in this section as it appears in the printed acts. 
Father cannot challenge paternity previ-
ously established. — Defendant's claim that 
he was entitled to challenge his paternity of a 
child, previously established under Utah law, 
by blood testing in accordance with 5 14-2-109 
(genetic tests), was foreclosed by the full faith 
and credit clause of the United States constitu-
tion, the doctrine of res judicata, and Wyoming 
precedent. Livingston v. Vanderiet, 861 P.2d 
549 (Wyo. 1993). 
Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. 
— Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
ALR4th 565. 
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10-4-128. Duties of responding court 
) A responding court has the following duties which may be carried out 
ugh the clerk of the court: 
(i) To transmit to the initiating court any payment made by the 
obligor pursuant to any order of the court or otherwise; and 
(ii) To furnish to the initiating court upon request a certified 
statement of all payments made by the obligor. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; 
W.S. 1957, § 20-133; Rev. W.S. 1957, 9 20-132; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; 
Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-128.) 
iter's notes. — There is no subsection (b) 
i section as it appears in the printed acts. 
)-4-129. Receipt and disbursement of payments by initi-
ating court. 
initiating court shall receive and disburse forthwith all payments made 
e obligor or sent by the responding court. This duty may be carried out 
igh the clerk of the court. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-134; 
W.S. 1957, § 20-133; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
4-129.) 
-4-130. Responding court not to stay proceeding or 
refuse hearing; order of support pendente lite. 
ssponding court shall not stay the proceeding or refuse a hearing under 
ct [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] because of any pending or prior action 
ceeding for divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus, 
on or custody in this or any other state. The court shall hold a hearing 
ay issue a support order pendente lite. In aid thereof it may require the 
r to give a bond for the prompt prosecution of the pending proceeding. If 
her action or proceeding is concluded before the hearing in the instant 
ding and the judgment therein provides for the support demanded in 
mplaint being heard, the court shall conform its support order to the 
it allowed in the other action or proceeding. Thereafter the court shall 
ay enforcement of its support order because of the retention of 
ction for enforcement purposes by the court in the other action or 
ling. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-135; Rev. W.S. 1957, 
14; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-130.) 
liction to modify registered foreign there was no final money judgment, the court 
order and payment of arrearages, had jurisdiction to modify payment of the 
te this section, a state court had arrearages. Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213 
on, under i 20-4-136(a), to modify a (Wyo. 1985). 
i foreign support order. Also, since 
68 
§ 20-4-131 RECIPROCAL EJNFUKCUMttm ur a u r r u r i i s ^u-t-ioo 
§ 20-4-131. Support order not superseded by order of 
another court, 
A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this act 
(§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] does not nullify and is not nullified by a 
support order made fc? a court of this state pursuant to any other law or by a 
support order made by a court of any other state pursuant to a substantially 
similar act or any other law, regardless of priority of issuance, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by the court. Amounts paid for a particular 
period pursuant to any support order made by the court of another state shall 
be credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under 
any support order made by the court of this state. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; 
W.S. 1957, § 20-136; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-135; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. 
W.S. 1957, § 20-4-131.) 
Applied in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213 Am. Jur. 2d, ALU and C.J.S. references. 
(Wyo. 1985). — Construction and effect of provision of 
Quoted in Poirrier v. Jones, 781 P.2d 531 ^^m R e c i p r o c a l Enforcement of Support (Wyo 1989) ™* t n a t n o 8UPP°rt order shall supersede or 
nullify any other order, 31 ALR4th 347. 
§ 20-4-132. Enforcement of support within Wyoming. 
(a) The method of enforcement of duties of support provided in this act 
(§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138] is applicable as nearly as possible if both the 
obligee and obligor are in Wyoming but in different counties. 
(b) If the appropriate court of the county in which the petition for support 
is filed finds that the obligor owes a duty of support and that a court of 
another county may obtain jurisdiction over the obligor or his property, the 
clerk of court shall send the petition and a certificate of findings to the court of 
the county in which the obligor or his property is found. An initiating or 
responding court and the clerk of court have the duties and powers provided in 
this act in enforcing this section. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-137; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-136; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1, Rev. W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-4-132.) 
§ 20-4-133. Attorney general may appeal or cause an ap-
peal in public interest. 
(a) If the attorney general is of the opinion that a support order is 
erroneous and presents a question of law warranting an appeal in the public 
interest, he may: 
(i) Perfect an appeal to the proper appellate court if the support order 
was issued by a court of this state; or 
(ii) If the support order was issued in another state, cause the appeal 
to be taken in the other state. In either case expenses of appeal may be 
paid on his order from funds appropriated for his office. (Laws 1973, ch. 
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155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-138; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-137; Laws 1977, ch. 
152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-133.) 
Editor's notes. — There is no subsection (b) 
this section as it appears in the printed acts. 
20>4-134. Registration of foreign support orders; prose-
cuting attorney to assist obligee. 
(a) If the duty of support is based on a foreign support order, the obligee 
ay register the foreign support order in a court of this state in the manner, 
ith the effect and for the purposes herein provided. 
(b) The clerk of the court shall maintain a registry of foreign support 
ders in which he shall file foreign support orders. 
(c) If this state is acting either as a rendering or a registering state the 
osecuting attorney upon the request of the court, a state department of 
ilfare or other local welfare official shall represent the obligee in proceed-
£8 under this part [chapter]. If the prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses 
represent the obligee, the attorney general may order him to comply with 
i request of the court or may undertake the representation. (Laws 1973, ch. 
5, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-139; Rev. W.S. 1957, 5 20-138; Laws 1977, ch. 152, 
I; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-134.) 
tated in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213 
o. 1985). 
20-4-135. Registration of foreign support orders; support-
ing documents required for registration; notice 
to obligor. 
0 An obligee seeking to register a foreign support order in a court of this 
e shall transmit to the clerk of the court three (3) certified copies of the 
IT with all modifications thereof, one (1) copy of the reciprocal enforcement 
upport act of the state in which the order was made, and a statement 
fled and signed by the obligee showing the post office address of the 
gee, the last known place of residence and post office address of the 
sjor, the amount of support remaining unpaid, a description and the 
tion of any property of the obligor available upon execution and a list of 
states in which the order is registered. Upon receipt of these documents 
clerk of the court, without payment of a filing fee or other cost to the 
fee, shall file them in the registry of foreign support orders. The filing 
titutes registration under this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138]. 
> Promptly upon registration the clerk of the court shall send by certified 
egistered mail to the obligor at the address given a notice of the 
tration with a copy of the registered support order and the post office 
sss of the obligee. He shall also docket the case and notify the prosecuting 
ney of his action. The prosecuting attorney shall proceed diligently to 
70 
enforce the order. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-140; Rev. W.S. 
1957, § 20-139; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-135.) 
SUted in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213 
(Wyo. 1985) 
§ 20-4-136. Foreign support order subject to same defenses 
and proceedings as order from this state. 
(a) Upon registration, the registered foreign support order shall be treated 
in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this state. It has 
the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and 
proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a support order of this state 
and may be enforced and satisfied in like manner. No support order issued by 
a court of another state shall be modified in a proceeding under this act if the 
court which entered the support order had jurisdiction over the parties at the 
time the order was issued and the child or either of the parties resides in that 
state. After proper notice and an opportunity to present evidence, other 
registered support orders may be prospectively modified in accordance with 
W.S. 20-6-306. 
Cb) The obligor has twenty (20) days after the mailing of notice of the 
registration in which to petition the court to vacate the registration or for 
other relief. If he does not so petition the registered support order is 
confirmed. 
(c) At the hearing to enforce the registered support order the obligor may 
present only matters that would be available to him as defenses in an action 
to enforce a foreign money judgment. If the obligor shows to the court that an 
appeal from the order is pending or will be taken or that a stay of execution 
has been granted the court shall stay enforcement of the order until the 
appeal is concluded, the time for appeal has expired, or the order is vacated, 
upon satisfactory proof that the obligor has furnished security for payment of 
the support ordered as required by the rendering state. If the, obligor shows to 
the court any ground upon which enforcement of a support order of this state 
may be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the order for an 
appropriate period if the obligor furnishes the same security for payment of 
the support ordered that is required for a support order of this state. (Laws 
1973, ch. 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-141; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-140; Laws 1977, 
ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-136; Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 1.) 
The 1993 amendment added the last two 184, §§ 1 and 2, which appears as various 
sentences in subsection (a). sections throughout title 20. See the Table of 
Laws 1993, ch. 184, § 2, makes the act Disposition of Acts in volume 1. 
effective immediately upon completion of all Jurisdiction to modify registered foreign 
acta necessary for a bill to become law as support order despite § 20-4-130.— Despite 
provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved ( 20-4-130 (no stay of proceedings), a state 
March 5, 1993. court had jurisdiction, under subsection (a), to 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this modify a registered foreign support order. Also, 
act," which appears in the next-to-last sen- since there was no final money judgment the 
tence in subsection (a), means Laws 1993, ch. court had jurisdiction to modify payment of the 
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arrearages. Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P 2d 213 party determines that modification of a regis-
(Wyo. 1986) (decided prior to the 1993 amend tered foreign support order is proper, notice 
ment). and an opportunity to present evidence must 
Obl igee m u s t b e g iven not ice a n d o p p o r be given to the obligee. Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 
ttinjty to b e h e a r d . — Where the responding P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1985) (decided prior to the 1993 
court on its own initiative or upon motion of m amendment), 
§ 20-4137. Interpretation. 
This act [§§ 20-4-101 through 20-4-138) shall be so construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it. (Laws 1973, ch, 155, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 20-142, Rev W.S. 1957, 
§ 20-141; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. W.S. 1957, § 20-4-137.) 
% j o t e d in Bjugan v. Bjugan. 710 R2d 213 (Wyo. 1985). 
§ 20-4-138. Short title. 
This act f§§ 20-4-101 through 20 4-138] may be cited as the Revised 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. (Laws 1973, ch. 155, § 1; 
W.S. 1957, f 20-143; Rev, W.S. 1957, § 20-142; Laws 1977, ch. 152, § 1; Rev. 
W.S. 1957, § 20-4-138.) 
Severabi l i ty . — Laws 1973, ch. 166, f 2 , a^ect other provisions or icatio the act 
provide*: "If any provision of this act or the which can be given effe thout nvalid 
application thereof to any person or ctrcum- provision or application to tj id the 
itance is held invalid, the invalidity does not provisions of this act a. >erab._ 
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20-6-101. Short t i # e 20 5 114 
20-5-102. P u r p o s e d 
20-5-103. Definitions. 
20 5-104. Jurisdiction to make . 20-5-116. 
determination. 
20 5-105. Notice before decree. 20-5-116. 
20^6-106. Notice for exercise of jurisdiction 
over person outside this state; 20 5-117 
time; service; exception. 
20-5-107. Exercise of jurisdiction by court in 20 5 118. 
this s tate; proceedings in other 20 5-119. 
states. 
20 5-108, Court may decline to exercise juris- 20 5-120. 
diction. 
20-5-109. Wrongful or improper removal of a 
child from another state 20-5-121 
20-5-110. Custody proceeding; required infer- 10-5-122, 
mation. 
20-5-111. Person having custody to be joined 20-5-123. 
as a party. 
20-5-112. Court may order party to proceeding 20-5-124. 
to appear. 
20-5-113. Custody decree binding on all par- 20-5-125. 
ties. 
Recognition and enforcement of ini-
tial or modification decree made 
by court of another s t a te . 
Modifying custody decree made by 
court of another s ta te . 
Effect of custody decree made by 
court of another s ta te . 
Clerk of district court to main ta in 
registry; contents. 
Forwarding copy of decree, 
Testimony of witnesses; method of 
obtaining. 
Requesting court of another s ta te to 
adduce evidence; order par ty to 
appear. 
Request from courts of another s ta te . 
Preserving records of custody pro-
ceeding. 
Custody proceeding; record from an-
other state. 
Policies applicable to in te rna t iona l 
area. 
Priority of custody proceeding raia 
ing queation of jurisdiction. 
C r o s s r e f e r e n c e s . — As to temporary cus-
tody of child during pendency of court action, 
see § 20-2-112. As to disposition and provision 
for children in decree, see § 20-2-113. 
Law r e v i e w s . — For article, "Mediation and 
Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases — Practi-
cal Considerations, Ethical Concerns and Pro-
posed Standards of Practice," see XXVII Land 
& Water L. Rev. 435 (1992). 
Am. Jur . 2d, ALR a n d C.J.S. r e fe rences . 
— Admissibility of social worker's expert testi-
mony on child custody issues, 1 ALR4th 837, 
Initial award or denial of child custody to 
homosexual or lesbian parent, 6 ALR4th 1297, 
Propriety of awarding joint custody of chil-
dren, 17 ALR4th 1013. 
Interference by custodian of child with non-
custodial parent 's visitation r ights as ground 
for change of custody, 28 ALR4th 9. 
Attorneys' fee awards in parent-nonparent 
child custody cases, 45 ALR4th 212. 
Parent 's transsexuality as factor in award of 
custody of children, visitation r igh t s or termi-
nation of parental rights, 59 ALR4th 1170 
Tort liability of public au thor i ty for failure 
to remove parentally abused or neglected chil-
dren from parents ' custody, 60 ALR4th 942. 
State court's authority, in mar i t a l or child 
custody proceeding, to allocate federal income 
tax dependency exemption for child to noncus-
todial parent under § 152(e) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (26 USC § 152(e)), 77 ALR4th 
786. 
Applicability of Uniform Child Custody J u -
risdiction Act (UCCJA) to temporary custody 
orders, 81 ALR4th 1101. 
Child custody; when does s ta te t h a t issued 
previous custody determination have continu-
ing jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or Paren ta l Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USC § 1738A, 
83 ALR4th 742. 
Child custody and visitation r ights of person 
infected with AIDS, 86 ALR4th 211 . 
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THIS MATTER WAS TRIED TO THE COURT on June 8, 1994. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the Court announced to counsel that the 
Court was satisfied that Defendant is the biological father of Cody 
Ray Holland, born April 1, 1977. There was an overwhelming 
abundance of evidence to this effect. 
During the trial, Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss based 
upon various Wyoming statutes. The Court desired both counsel to 
research and brief these statutory issues and therefore, allowed 
the parties time in which to submit memoranda of points and 
authorities concerning the issues of law. The Court has now 
reviewed the Defendant's Memorandum, the Plaintiff's responsive 
Memorandum and the Defendant's rebuttal Memorandum. 
/SfcP/1 4 i». 
* 
* MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* 








Utah law applies to this case. Under the uniform reciprocal 
enforcement of support act adopted by both the State of Utah and 
State of Wyoming, the statutes of the State of Utah, as the 
responding state, apply. Additionally, the Plaintiff/mother was a 
resident of the State of Utah at the time of conception and the 
conception occurred in the State of Utah. Therefore, under U.C.A. 
78-12-45, even if Wyoming law applied, the Plaintiff would have the 
right to pursue this action. 
Defendant relies on Wyoming statute 14-2-102 et. seq. in 
making the argument that inasmuch as Ernie Holland acknowledged the 
paternity of Cody, Ernie Holland is the presumed father. This 
Court specifically finds there is no presumption that Ernie Holland 
is the father of Cody Holland. The Decree of Divorce, entered 
February 6, 1981, by the 254th Judicial District Court in Dallas 
County, Texas, between Ernie B. Holland and Cody's mother, the 
Plaintiff, Terry McNinch, specifically decrees that "no children 
now under the age of 18 were born to the marriage and none are 
expected". This Decree was entered within five (5) years of the 
birth of Cody Holland and satisfies the requirements of Wyoming 
statute 14-2-104. 
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Therefore, while concluding that Utah law governs in this 
case, this Court also concludes that whether Utah or Wyoming 
statutes are applied, the Plaintiff has the right to pursue this 
action. 
POINT 2 
The doctrines of laches and estoppel are unsupported by the 
facts of this case. In order to invoke the equitable remedies of 
laches or estoppel, the Defendant must himself have "clean hands". 
The evidence in this case is abundant that Defendant, upon learning 
of Plaintiff's pregnancy, became upset, refused responsibility for 
the child, threatened to leave, and prior to the birth, actually 
did leave and did not return. The Plaintiff continually tried to 
locate Defendant on her own and through Defendant's relatives. She 
was able to make contact with Defendant in 1981 and 1982 and 
Defendant actually met the child. Defendant repeatedly refused to 
provide Plaintiff an address or other information concerning him. 
Plaintiff was again able to make contact with Defendant in 1992 and 
she and the minor child visited with Defendant in the State of 
Utah. Photographs submitted in evidence show Defendant and the 
minor child posing together and reveal a strong resemblance in the 
physical characteristics of the two individuals. Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH v. TERRY WESTMORELAND 
#934-65 
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c o n t i n u e d t o make h i m s e l f u n a v a i l a b l e t o P l a i n t i f f o r t h e m i n o r 
c h i l d and c o n t i n u e d t o r e f u s e any i n f o r m a t i o n a s t o h i s r e s i d e n c e 
o r employment . 
Whi le De fendan t a s s e r t s t h e d e f e n s e of e s t o p p e l , t h e e v i d e n c e 
d o e s n o t s u p p o r t any of t h e t h r e e r e q u i r e d e l e m e n t s f o r s u c h a 
d e f e n s e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e d e f e n s e o f l a c h e s i s i n a p p l i c a b l e 
b e c a u s e i t a p p e a r s t o t h e Cour t t h e major r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y i n 
p r o s e c u t i n g t h i s p r o c e e d i n g was D e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s . 
CONCLUSION 
The C o u r t r u l e s t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t i s t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r of 
C o d y R a y H o l l a n d , b o r n A p r i l 1 , 1 9 7 7 , a n d t h a t P l a i n t i f f i s 
e n t i t T e d t o t h e r e l i e f a s s o u g h t i n t h e C o m p l a i n t . 
C o u n s e l f o r P l a i n t i f f i s d i r e c t e d t o p r e p a r e F i n d i n g s , 
C o n c l u s i o n s , and a Judgment i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s D e c i s i o n . 
DATED t h i s I day of S e p t e m b e r , 1994 . 
BY THE COURT: 
iLA •JL 
JUDGE BEN H. HADF 
FIRST DISTRICT COlffcT 




I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, State of Utah et al v. Terry 
Westmoreland, Case No. 934-65, postage prepaid, this 7^ day of 
September, 1994, to the following: 
STEVEN A. COMBE, ESQ. GREGORY SKABELUND, ESQ. 
Assistant Attorney General 2176 North Main 
2540 Washington Blvd. Logan, Utah 84321 
7th Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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the demand if the obligor is complying with the support 
order. 
Obviously, the emphasis of section 6 is that criminal 
extradition should be a last resort" remedy. Where 
civil enforcement is oi limited value, however, the 
attorney should know how to effectively invoke URE-
SA's extradition provisions. 
V. C I V I L E N F O R C E M E N T 
A support duty can be civilly enforced under URESA 
through two procedures: the filing of a regular URESA 
petition and registration of a "foreign" support order. 
What follows is a chronological step-by-step explana-
tion oi the regular petition process; registration of an 
existing support order is discussed in Section VI. For 
the most part, discussion will be based on the 1968 
Revised pniiorm Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act. Where other versions are signiticantlv different, 
those differences will be noted. 
A. Standing To File 
A URESA action may be initiated by any obligee. 
An obligee is defined by section 2(f) o( RURESA as a 
person to whom a duty of support is owed. The defi-
nition is broad enough to include a spouse or ex-spouse 
seeking support/ Many responding states, however 
are reluctant .to initially establish a spousal support 
order through URESA. See Section V. C of this chap-
ter. Also, some states refuse to hear "alimony only" 
URESA cases because such cases do not qualify for 
IV-D services and therefore do not result in federal 
incentive payments. Unfortunately, in states taking that 
approach, a spouse's only option may be to hire a 
private attorney to file an action in the second state— 
an option beyond the financial resources of many obli-
gees. An obligee may also be a person who has com-
menced a URESA proceeding for enforcement of an 
aliened duly of support. Section 2(0 of RURESA. The 
definition therefore includes an unwed mother or a 
spouse seeking the initial establishment of a support 
order. 
If the obligee is a minor, the person having legal 
custody o( the minor may file a petition on the minor's 
behalf without appointment as guardian ad litem. Sec-
tion 13 of RURESA. Some states that have enacted 
section 13 of RURESA have given an expansive read-
ing to legal custody as an element of standing, allowing 
a child's de facto caretaker to tile the action. Since the 
primary issue in a URESA proceeding is the duty of 
support, these courts hold that if parents fail to provide 
for their children, they are obligated to reimburse those 
who do. See. <'.-.. Saask v. YandelL 702 P.2d 1327 
(Alaska 1985) (stepfather, who lacks legal custody but 
acts as child's de facto guardian, has standing to file a 
URESA action against child's natural father); Suddetli 
\\ Scou. 394 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1984) (grandmother, with 
whom dependent resided with knowledge and consent 
of dependents divorced parents, has standing to sue 
the dependent's mother for support under URESA). A 
few states, in enacting section 13. have eliminated the 
restriction to legal custody. They allow any person with 
custody (physical or legal) to file a URESA petition on 
behalf of a minor without appointment of a guardian ad 
litem. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 13:1667 (West 1983): 
N.C. Gen. Stat. S 52A-I0.2 (1984). It would appear that 
in these states, the fact that the petitioner has physical 
custody of the child in violation of a court decree is not 
a valid ground for dismissal by the responding court of 
a URESA petition. 
RURESA further provides that an obligee includes 
a state or political subdivision to whom a duty of sup-
port is owed because of public assistance provided to 
the obligor's dependents. Sections 2(f), (8) of RURESA. 
B. Representation in the Initiating State 
The 1950 version o( URESA lacks any provision 
concerning representation of the obligee in the initiating 
state. Such a provision first appears in 1952 and is 
retained in each amended URESA version. Section 11 
in 1952 version. Section 12 in 1958 and 1968 versions. 
The provision specifies that upon request of the court 
or local welfare official, the prosecuting attorney in the 
initiating state is responsible for representing the obli-
gee. Section 12 of RURESA further provides that if the 
prosecuting attorney neglects or refuses to represent 
the obligee, the Attornev General may order the pros-
ecutor to fulfill his or her duty or may undertake rep-
resentation himself or herself. This statement was added 
in response to reports of unenthusiastic representation 
by prosecuting attorneys. 
In enacting the representation provision of URESA, 
many states have identified legal offices—other than 
the prosecutor's office—as having responsibility for 
representing URESA petitioners. In nearly all states, 
however, representation is provided by some type of 
government attorney. A few states, such as Connecti-
cut, contract with private attorneys to represent URESA 
petitioners. 
Nothing in U RES A precludes a private attorney from 
assisting a client in filing a URESA action. In fact, some 
states have expressly provided that option in their 
URESA provisions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1655.5 (West 
1982); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 576-25 (1985); Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 518C.07 (West Supp. 1989). Private attorney 
representation is consistent with the intent of the Act's 
Aft 
7017 ALBER1 PICK ROAD 
€ft££NS80Ra NC 27*0*4054 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA > AFFIDAVIT OF GENETIC 
ss» TESTING EXPERT 
GUILFORD COUNTY ) 
Deborah L. Cutter. P h D being first duly sworn, states as follows: 
1» I am an Associate Director of the Parentage Evaluation Laboratory at Genetic Design, Inc., and a custodian of Ita 
records of genetic testing performed in this case, as such, em 9 proper person to make this affidavit* f have 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this affidavit. 
2 . Genetic Design is certified by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 1$ accredited by the American 
Association of Blood Banks. 
3. Genetic Oesign received and tested blood samples from the following individuals: 
Mother: TERRY MCNINCH 
Child: CODY HOLLAND end, 
ANeged Father: TERRY WESTMORELAND. 
4. Genetic Oesign received the alleged father's blood sample on November 23 , 1993 . The sample was delivered to 
Genetic Design's laboratory by Overnight Courier. 
5. Genetic Design received the blood samples of the mother and child(ren) on August 17, 1993 . The samples were 
delivered to Genetic Design's laboratory by Overnight Courier, 
6. At the time of receipt all blood samples were examined, found to be intact, logged inr assigned a unique 
identification number, end taken to work stations on the premises for testing. The samples were at all times 
segregated from ell other samples. 
7* Genetic paternity testing was performed on the blood samples from the individuals in this case. The genetic tests 
performed and the procedures followed were in compliance with the Standards for Parentage Testing Laboratories 
published by the American Association of Blood Banks (the "Standards11). The results and conclusions are Indicated 
on the attached report. 
8. All tests were performed in compliance with the Standards and were analyzed Independently by two or more 
laboratory technologists under my supervision and control. The test results were initially reviewed by the laboratory 
staff end again by myself to verify the accuracy of the report. 
9. The testing conducted is accepted by the scientific, medical and legal communities es reliable in resolving cases of 
disputed parentage. Calculations for testing were performed using published gene frequency tables and a completely 
documented computer program. 
10. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and if sworn as a witness, I can testify 
competently thereto. 
DATED this day of ^ a V , 199J-
Deborah L. Cutter* Ph.D, Associate Director 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this *A day of %Ls>J . 1 9 9 j L ~ 





















































































PROBABILITY OF PATERNITY 39 99% COMBINED PATERNITY INDt-X S9047 to 1 
The alleged father, TERRY WESTMORELAND, cannot be excluded aa the biological father of CODY HOLLAND. Based on the 
above genetic testing results, the probability of paternity la 99.99% aa compared to an untested random man of the North American 
Caucasian population. (Prior Probability * .5) 
I, the underagned Director, upon being duly sworn on oath, do depose and state that I 'cad the foregoing report on the analysis of genetic specimens from 
the above-named Individuals, signed by myself, and that the tacts and results therein are true and oorraot 
Swqm to and "Su^g^eJiJbefore me this 
atGreeriri&to, NoMhCa&iii&. 
S orn






^ - ^ u r \ * * J « fnj* ia arihari hv tha Partmtaae Testina Committee, American Association of Blood 
• R.Scott Foster, PhD,, Director 
D BertaHamby Muggins, Ph.D., Director 
• Robert A, Bever,PHJX, Director 
n Lawrence A. Chaver, Ph .DM Director 
££DeborahL Cutter, Ph.D.. Aeeodate Director 
D ChartesM.Kelly^hl 
D RuthP Koester, Ph.| 3* PLAINTIFFS 
MBIT 
BILL LONG 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURTS 
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE J IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF ERNIE DWAYNE HOLLAND ) 254th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
AND TERRY ME HOLt AND J DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
On the 6th day of February i lQ$i f Petitioner 
ERNIE DWAYNE HOLLAND appeared in person and by 
attorney and announced ready for trial. 
Respondent waived issuance and service of citation by waiver duly filed and 
did not otherwise appear. 
The Court, having examined the pleadings and heard the evidence and 
argument of counsel» finds that all necessary residence qualifications and prereq-
uisites of law have been legally satisfied, that this Court has jurisdiction of aii the 
parties and subject: matter ot this cause, and that the material allegations 
contained in Petitioner's pleadings are true. A jury was waived, and all matters in 
controversy, including questions of fact and of law, were submitted to the Court. 
All persons entitled to citation were properly cited, 
IT 15 DECREED that ERNIE DV/AYNE HOLlAW 
Petit ioner
 t and TERRY RAE HOLLAND 
Respondent, be and they are hereby divorced, 
IT )S DECREED triat the personal property of the parties be and is hereby 
awarded to the party having possession of such property on the date ol this decree. 
The parties retirement plans and disability benefits* 11 any, and other benefits 
which arise irom tneir employment or military service are awarded as their sole 
and separate property to that party from whose employment or military service 
these benef i ts arise. 
The Court finds that no children, now under the age of IS years, were born to 
the marriage and none are expected, 
AU cos ts of court expended in this cause are adjudged against the party by 
whom incurred, for which let execution issue. 
IT IS DECREED that all relief requested in this cause and not expressly 
granted herein be and is hereby denied. 
SIGNED this 6th day of February
 -f 19C1. 
JUDGE PRESIDING I f •»?••" I 
